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Agentic AI Security Tools

Observed security tools, scanners, frameworks, and defensive or dual-use artifacts relevant to agentic AI systems.

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GitHub - mars2021y-gif/autonomous-ai-agent-security-incidents-2026: Autonomous AI Agent Security Incidents of 2026: Benchmark dataset (109 incidents), falsification matrix, 2-page executive summary, and multi-agent privilege attenuation harness (100% EPR).

The GitHub repository 'autonomous-ai-agent-security-incidents-2026' by mars2021y-gif publishes a benchmark dataset of 109 autonomous AI agent security incidents, a falsification matrix, a two-page executive summary, and a multi-agent privilege attenuation harness claiming 100% EPR, with GitHub Actions CI. The project is positioned as a downloadable/runnable artifact for evaluating and hardening multi-agent AI systems. Details →

sloppy-joe — Shields against supply-chain, slopsquatting, and typosquatting attacks from dependencies and code.

sloppy-joe is an open-source defensive tool (brennhill/sloppy-joe) that shields software projects against supply-chain, slopsquatting, and typosquatting attacks originating from dependencies and code. Slopsquatting specifically targets the AI-driven threat of LLMs hallucinating non-existent package names during code generation, which attackers can register to poison the supply chain; the project documents support across ecosystems (Python, JavaScript, Rust, Go, Ruby, PHP, JVM, .NET). Details →

provenance-gate/posts/01-provenance-vs-detection.en.md at main · Yehielamor/provenance-gate

The provenance-gate project publishes a deterministic tool gateway that sits between an AI agent and its tools and, rather than reading or classifying injected text, tracks the provenance of each value in a tool call (recipient, IBAN, URL, amount). In evaluation on AgentDojo (assuming the model is always hijacked), the gateway blocked 99.3% of 609 hijacked attacks and held steady against reversed, base64, invisible-Unicode-tag, and machine-translated obfuscations, while three open prompt-injection classifiers showed high false positives and poor detection of obfuscated injections. Details →

GitHub - rudratoshs/buried-injections: 🛡️ Regex catches 0%, Meta's Prompt Guard 2 catches 1% of 629 realistic AgentDojo injection attacks when they're buried in tool output. Reproducible benchmark. · GitHub

The 'buried-injections' GitHub project is a reproducible benchmark showing that regex-based detection catches 0% and Meta's Prompt Guard 2 catches roughly 1% of 629 realistic AgentDojo prompt-injection attacks when the malicious instructions are buried inside tool output (indirect prompt injection). The benchmark is published as runnable code demonstrating the gap between existing detectors and realistic indirect-injection scenarios. Details →

GitHub - guillaumemeyer/watermarks-remover: Strip multi-vendor AI provenance marks: Unicode text hygiene, statistical rewrite hooks, and C2PA/metadata from PNG/JPEG/SVG/PDF/DOCX/HTML/MD

watermarks-remover is an open-source tool that strips multi-vendor AI provenance marks — including C2PA content credentials, statistical text watermarks, invisible Unicode markers, and metadata — from PNG/JPEG/SVG/PDF/DOCX/HTML/MD and audio/video files. It ships with a Claude plugin PostToolUse hook that automatically detects and removes provenance marks from files an AI agent writes, defeating attribution mechanisms like SynthID and C2PA. Details →