First reported · updated · 5 reports nhimg.org
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported · updated · 6 reports thehackernews.com
How MCP Servers Can Expose Enterprise Secrets
An explainer on Model Context Protocol (MCP) security describes how ungoverned MCP servers expand the enterprise attack surface, cataloging five vectors — confused deputy, token passthrough, tool poisoning, SSRF via tool connectors, and rogue server registration — and noting MCP grants LLM runtimes ambient authority across multi-hop trust chains that identity and perimeter controls miss. The piece frames shadow AI and pre-production MCP deployments bypassing security review as the core governance gap, referencing the September 2025 Postmark malicious MCP server incident and control domains like OAuth 2.1 token exchange and server attestation. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports appsentinels.ai
Deadbugz: Currently Active MCP Supply-Chain Campaign
The "Deadbugz" campaign is an active MCP supply-chain operation in which malicious Model Context Protocol servers (such as the zellkernel/productivity-suite-mcp package) embed hidden instructions in tool metadata to hijack trusted tools connected to an AI agent, enabling data exfiltration like reading .env files or SSH keys. The campaign leverages cross-tool poisoning, where one poisoned MCP server can abuse other trusted connectors already wired into the agent, and is tied to a malicious GitHub account and associated threat-actor persona. Details →First reported dev.to
I broke an MCP server in 10 minutes — the exact prompt injection attack chain (with fixes)
A DEV Community write-up demonstrates an indirect prompt injection attack chain against a typical MCP server exposing read_file and send_email tools, where a submitted document containing a fake 'SYSTEM NOTE' instruction causes the model to exfiltrate /etc/passwd by email because no boundary separates data from instructions. The author outlines fixes (treat tool/file content as data, per-session tool allowlists, confirmation gates on external-sending tools) and notes tool-description poisoning persists across sessions. The post also promotes a free hosted scanner. Details →First reported arxiv.org
Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance:Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Servers
An empirical study (arXiv:2506.13538) analyzes 1,899 open-source Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers using a hybrid static-analysis and MCP-specific scanning pipeline, finding eight distinct vulnerability types with 7.2% of servers containing general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibiting MCP-specific tool poisoning. The authors argue for MCP-specific vulnerability detection, standardized vulnerability databases, and automated scanning within MCP registries. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports cybersecpentesting.com
Tool call poisoning in agentic AI: A technical guide to attack mechanics and defenses
A technical guide explains MCP tool poisoning, an indirect prompt injection attack in which a malicious Model Context Protocol server hides instructions in tool metadata (such as the tool's description field) so that when an AI agent calls the tool, injected instructions enter the LLM context and are treated as trusted input, enabling restricted tool calls, data leakage, or system-prompt bypass. The guide draws on an arXiv STRIDE/DREAD threat model that found tool poisoning to be the most impactful client-side MCP vulnerability across seven major MCP clients, and proposes multi-layered defenses including static metadata analysis, decision-path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports deepinspect.ai
MCP Server Security: How Malicious Tools Attack AI Agents | Precursor Security
An analysis of Model Context Protocol (MCP) server security synthesizes research showing publicly exposed, unauthenticated MCP servers nearly tripled from 492 (July 2025) to 1,467 (April 2026) per Trend Micro, that 33% of scanned servers carry critical vulnerabilities (Enkrypt AI), that static long-lived secrets dominate authentication (Astrix), and that 24,008 secrets leaked in MCP config files (GitGuardian). It frames these exposures against attack classes such as tool poisoning, credential theft via prompt injection, lateral movement, and full cloud compromise, referencing the OWASP MCP Top 10. Details →First reported dev.to
How I vet MCP servers before trusting them in my agent
A practitioner explainer describes how MCP tool descriptions, names, and input schemas are injected directly into an agent's context and are read by the model as instructions, enabling indirect prompt injection such as a tool description that tells the agent to email the conversation to an outside address. The author outlines four vetting checks: scanning tool descriptions and schemas for injection, scanning every tool result, watching tool arguments, and enforcing tenant isolation. Details →First reported silentrobots.com
MCP list caching and tool poisoning
An analysis of MCP tool poisoning explains how a malicious or compromised MCP server can change a tool's description after the user has approved it, embedding hidden instructions the model follows while the UI still shows the friendly approved name. The piece discusses how the 2026-07-28 MCP spec's new cacheable list fields (ttlMs and cacheScope) could blunt sudden catalog swaps and recommends clients hash approved catalogs, honor TTLs, show full descriptions, and pin versions. Details →First reported github.com
GitHub - ytkoka/mcp-tester: A web-based tool for inspecting MCP servers. Connect to any MCP server, browse its Tools, Resources, and Prompts, measure fetch latency, estimate token usage, score the quality of tool definitions, and compare two servers side by side, and scan for tool poisoning and rug pulls.
mcp-tester is an open-source web-based tool by ytkoka for inspecting MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers: it connects to any MCP server, browses Tools, Resources, and Prompts, measures fetch latency, estimates token usage, scores tool-definition quality, compares two servers, and scans for tool poisoning and rug pulls. The repository is published on GitHub under an MIT license with a live demo. Details →First reported simonwillison.net
The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication
Nexius Labs' concept guide on Human Control and Mission Control frames AI agent governance around the 'lethal trifecta' — access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and external communication — and describes attack classes like prompt injection and tool poisoning. Building on Simon Willison's original lethal-trifecta framework, it prescribes controls such as agent identity, evidence logging, risk-based human approval, capability constraints, and treating external content as evidence rather than authority. Details →First reported medium.com
MCP Security: Tool Poisoning, Line Jumping & Rug Pulls ...
An explainer article on MCP security walks through tool poisoning (malicious orders hidden in tool metadata that can exfiltrate credentials while returning correct answers), line jumping (context poisoning at connection time), and rug pulls (an approved server swapping in a malicious description later). It recommends treating MCP servers like dependencies by pinning them by version and content hash, defaulting to read-only, and requiring re-approval after changes. Details →First reported arxiv.org
ShareLock: A Stealthy Multi-Tool Threshold Poisoning Attack Against MCP
ShareLock is a research framework that performs a stealthy multi-tool threshold poisoning attack against the Model Context Protocol (MCP), using Shamir's secret-sharing scheme to distribute a malicious instruction as benign-looking shares across multiple tool descriptions that reconstruct into a hidden instruction only after a covert trigger is planted during a server update. Experiments across mainstream LLMs and two MCP clients report an average attack success rate exceeding 90% while evading tool-description-based detectors. Details →First reported owasp.org
MCP Security - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
The OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet catalogs the attack surface introduced by Anthropic's Model Context Protocol, which lets LLM agents dynamically invoke external tools. It enumerates key risk classes—tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, tool shadowing/cross-origin escalation, confused deputy, data exfiltration via legitimate channels, over-scoped tokens, supply chain attacks, message tampering/replay, and sandbox escapes—alongside best practices such as least privilege and scoped per-server credentials. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports medium.com
Your AI Agent Trusts Every Tool It's Ever Been Introduced To
An analysis piece, 'The MCP paradox,' argues that the Model Context Protocol standardized not only how agents reach tools but also how attackers reach agents, walking through concrete vectors like tool poisoning attacks where a malicious tool description instructs an agent to exfiltrate secrets (e.g. SSH keys) via text the user never sees. The article cites Invariant Labs' April 2025 tool-poisoning proof of concept and MCP's own design choices, and proposes defensive controls to harden MCP servers. Details →First reported acm.org
Confused Deputy Attack Against Model Context Protocol
An ACM TOSEM paper uncovers the "confused deputy attack" against the Model Context Protocol (MCP), where an adversarial server with subtly manipulated metadata overshadows a benign server and intercepts tool invocations without overt malicious behavior. The authors built Puppet, an automated evaluation framework that rewrites benign tool descriptions to hijack tool selection, achieving hijacking rates up to 90.89% and payload execution up to 86.46% across 14 models, while evading MCP-Scan and McpSafetyScanner which cannot detect metadata-level manipulation. Details →How the wire is made
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