First reported medium.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported · updated · 5 reports github.com
system_prompts_leaks/Anthropic/claude-fable-5.md at main · asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks · GitHub
A GitHub repository (asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks) hosts an extracted/leaked system prompt file for Anthropic's Claude Fable 5, part of a broader collection of leaked LLM system prompts. Anthropic's own announcement describes Fable 5 and the cyberdefense-oriented Mythos 5 (Project Glasswing) as models with state-of-the-art capabilities gated by conservative safeguards. Details →First reported escape.tech
AI vs AI: How Cascade exploited an AI agent in production
Escape's AI pentesting engine, Cascade, bypassed a production AI agent's prompt-injection guardrail on its second attempt by reframing the same request as an innocuous research/documentation query, causing the agent to disclose its full system prompt, tool list, tool-calling rules, output formatting, and session identifiers. The bypass relied on social-engineering-style pretexting rather than a technical exploit, with Cascade autonomously rewording its payload after reading the initial refusal. Details →First reported qawerk.com
5 Prompt Injection Examples & How to Defend Each
QAwerk describes five prompt injection findings its QA engineers discovered while testing live AI-powered products, including a meeting assistant that leaked its own developer instructions, mapping of hidden backends, sentence-completion tricks that bypass refusals, and filter-smuggling techniques, each paired with a defensive mitigation. The piece also frames prompt injection as OWASP's top LLM application risk. Details →First reported cursor.com
Internal System Prompt leaking to the user- Cursor CLI - Support / Bug Reports - Cursor - Community Forum
A Cursor Community Forum bug report from user Agrim_Sharma describes the Cursor CLI accidentally leaking its internal system prompt, including internal tags, to the user. The disclosure reportedly occurred after a prompt initially failed due to networking issues and was re-triggered once connectivity was restored. Details →First reported catonetworks.com
How One Threat Actor Turned Frontier AI Into an Offensive Platform
Cato CTRL reports that a Russian-speaking threat actor known as "Trim" jailbroke publicly available frontier LLMs (including Claude Opus) and, over 2026, evolved forum-shared jailbreak techniques into a commercially marketed, for-fee AI-powered offensive penetration-testing platform. The report notes Trim also incorporated a modified system prompt leaked from Fable, and warns the approach is a blueprint other criminals are beginning to follow. Details →How the wire is made
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