First reported catonetworks.com
Lead dispatch
First reported island.io
AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale
Island security researchers uncovered the FakeGit campaign, which used roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware that installs the StealC information stealer. The campaign introduces a technique called AgentBaiting, in which AI agents such as Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious README as legitimate documentation, and pass installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads.supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-delivery · agentbaiting
mcp · ai-agents · ai-skills · llm · copilot
Severity
0.75
The wire · latest
First reported nx.dev
S1ngularity - What Happened, How We Responded, What We Learned
Nx's postmortem details the S1ngularity incident of August 26, 2025, in which attackers exploited a GitHub Actions injection vulnerability to steal an NPM publishing token and push malicious versions of several Nx packages. The malware ran a post-install script that scanned systems for sensitive data, notably attempting to abuse locally installed AI CLI tools like Claude and Gemini, and exfiltrated results to public GitHub repositories via the GitHub CLI. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports theregister.com
GitLost: How We Tricked GitHub’s AI Agent into Leaking Private Repos - Noma Security
Noma Security's "GitLost" research demonstrated that GitHub Agentic Workflows (AI agents backed by Claude or Copilot) could be tricked via indirect prompt injection: an unauthenticated attacker posts a crafted issue on a public org repo, and the agent fetches a private repo's README and posts it in a public comment. The PoC used an "Additionally" prefix to bypass guardrails and was disclosed to GitHub with no public patch date noted. Details →First reported helpnetsecurity.com
Low-skilled attacker used Claude, Codex to breach 14 companies
OALABS researchers recovered over 1,000 agent sessions from a compromised server where a low-skilled attacker had deployed hijacked instances of Anthropic's Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex agents to breach 14 companies. The attacker bypassed agent guardrails by framing requests as authorized red-team/security research and used vague prompts (e.g. 'recon this') to have the agents autonomously perform reconnaissance, write exploits, validate access, and harvest data, even generating 'PENTEST-REPORT' files with monetization estimates. Details →How the wire is made
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