First reported wiz.io
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported mdazlaanzubair.com
Are Leaked System Prompts Helpful?
An analysis piece by Muhammad Azlaan Zubair examines a GitHub repository (asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks) with 63K+ stars collecting supposedly leaked system prompts from ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok and others, questioning whether the exposures are truly accidental and noting some may have been extracted via prompt injection. Rather than resolving provenance, the author argues the prompts' layered structure reveals production LLM application architecture patterns like tool contracts, routing rules, and permission behavior. Details →First reported google.com
AI Protection overview | Security Command Center | Google Cloud Documentation
Google Cloud's Security Command Center documentation describes AI Protection, a set of defensive services for securing AI workloads on Google Cloud, including AI Discovery, Model Armor (protection against prompt injection and jailbreak), Agent Platform Threat Detection, Agent Platform Vulnerability Assessment, Notebook Security Scanner, and Sensitive Data Protection. The page catalogs detection services, compliance frameworks, and Event Threat Detection rules for Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform assets. Details →First reported google.com
Staying Ahead of Adversarial AI Through Agentic Source Code Review | Google Cloud Blog
Mandiant (Google Cloud) describes its Agentic Vulnerability Discovery Harness (AVDH), a multi-agent orchestration framework built on Google's Agent Development Kit that uses Gemini plus human expert-driven validation to find exploitable vulnerabilities in source code during proactive reviews, pentests, red-team ops, and incident response. Over 10 months it reportedly analyzed tens of millions of lines of code, generated tens of thousands of findings, and led to 12 assigned CVEs (e.g., CVE-2026-13242, CVE-2026-55803), including discovering 100+ critical bugs in stolen repositories in two days. Details →First reported · updated · 5 reports adversa.ai
Grok chat history leak: Cryptographic Context Injection
Adversa AI disclosed a technique it calls Cryptographic Context Injection that hides malicious instructions inside AES-256-GCM ciphertext, then induces an LLM to decrypt them in its own code-execution sandbox so the plaintext arrives as trusted runtime output that bypasses static guardrails. Demonstrated against live production Grok and Gemini, an ordinary 'summarize this page' request silently exfiltrates a Grok user's chat data with no click; the researchers reported it to xAI in June 2026 and say it was still reproducible against Grok as of August 19. Details →First reported nhimg.org
Notification-based Gemini prompt injection exposes AI assistant risk
SafeBreach Labs demonstrated that notification-based indirect prompt injections can manipulate Google Gemini through messaging channels like WhatsApp, Slack, and SMS, enabling fake trusted-contact messages, unauthorized tool use, memory poisoning, and recurring actions that persist after bypassing prior mitigations. The research shows untrusted notification text folded into the assistant's working context becomes an attack surface that content filters alone cannot secure. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports talosintelligence.com
“Keep going, bro. You’ve got this!” A data-driven look at how adversaries are weaponizing AI
Cisco Talos analyzed a corpus of prompt logs left behind on threat-actor endpoints running tools such as Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini, documenting how adversaries weaponize AI for malicious software development, scaling criminal operations, and vulnerability research. Talos found guardrails largely ineffective, with actors bypassing safety checks using simple authorization claims like 'I'm allowed to do this' rather than sophisticated encoding, and stored blanket authorizations in persistent memory. The report ties this to the recently disclosed Hugging Face and OpenAI agentic-attacker incident where autonomous agents escaped a sandbox and compromised production infrastructure. Details →First reported exploiting.systems
Prompt Injection in VirusTotal's Code Insights API
A researcher discovered prompt-injection flaws in VirusTotal's AI-powered Code Insights API (backed by gemini-2.5-flash), showing that embedded injection strings and false pretext in large block comments can suppress or alter analysis, force undocumented error schemas that leak the backend model, and induce false negatives or false positives. The bugs were accepted by Google's AI VRP on March 25, 2026 and are being patched. Details →First reported medium.com
Indirect prompt injection: what LLM bounty triagers actually reward | InfoSec-Writes Up
An InfoSec-Writes Up article by Muhammad Haider Tallal explains why bug bounty triagers at Google, OpenAI, and Mozilla's Odin frequently close direct prompt injection and jailbreaks as informational while paying for indirect injection chains that produce real account or data impact. It cites a case where a malicious task planted in a Jira ticket silently wiped a victim's Gemini memory and earned a $15,000 payout. Details →First reported bleepingcomputer.com
AI 'watermark removers' flood the web. Almost none can prove they work.
A market of 'AI watermark remover' tools has appeared following Anthropic's rollout of invisible marks in Claude's text output, spanning a GitHub project with over 4,500 stars (watermarks-remover), several newly registered web tools, and services like StealthGPT and Human Writes that advertise stripping Claude, Gemini, OpenAI and SynthID-Text watermarks. BleepingComputer reports that almost none of the claims can be verified because Anthropic has not published how its text watermark works or released a detector; the tools reliably strip only hidden Unicode characters and C2PA/EXIF/XMP file metadata, which is trivial and not proof of defeating the underlying statistical watermark. Details →First reported talosintelligence.com
“Keep going, bro. You’ve got this!” A data-driven look at how adversaries are weaponizing AI
Cisco Talos analyzed recovered prompt logs (from tools like Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini) to document how adversaries are weaponizing LLMs for malware development, scaling campaigns, and vulnerability research, finding guardrails offered little protection and that outcomes scaled with the actor's pre-existing skill. The report notes examples including a DDoS operator controlling ~2,000 infected Android TVs and a would-be pentest-tool developer targeting Brazilian sites, and cites the Hugging Face/OpenAI agentic sandbox-escape incident as evidence the 'agentic attacker' era has arrived. Details →First reported darktrace.com
Testing a Prompt injection Attack Against an Enterprise AI Agent
Darktrace ran a controlled experiment testing whether an enterprise Gemini AI agent in Google Cloud could be compromised by an indirect prompt injection hidden in an inbound email, and whether its behavioral email analysis could detect the attack first. Although the email contained no malware, malicious links, or sender-reputation indicators, Darktrace / EMAIL flagged and quarantined it based on anomalous language and behavioral context, referencing the EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711) Copilot vulnerability as a real-world analog. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports acm.org
Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Multi-Task Embedding-based Prompt | Proceedings of the 2026 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on AI Foundation Models and Software Engineering
Researchers present the Multi-Task Embedding-based Attack (MTEA), a jailbreak technique that embeds malicious instructions within three concurrent tasks (Code Understanding, Language Translation, and Pattern Adherence) to disrupt LLM safety alignment. Evaluated on six models including GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5-pro using AdvBench, MTEA reportedly achieves 100% attack success and following rates, defeats Perplexity Filter and SmoothLLM defenses, and reduces query costs by 90% versus baselines. Details →First reported google.com
Adversarial Misuse of Generative AI | Google Cloud Blog
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) published an analysis of how government-backed threat actors, information operations groups, and cyber criminals interacted with its Gemini AI assistant, finding that adversaries currently use it mostly for productivity gains (research, coding assistance, reconnaissance) rather than novel AI-enabled attacks. The report contrasts theoretical AI-misuse research against real-world observed usage across multiple nation-state and criminal actors. Details →First reported techxplore.com
Some agentic AI browsers may come with major cybersecurity risks
University of Washington researchers studied seven agentic AI browsers and found four allow attackers to bypass the same-origin policy, running a successful proof-of-concept attack against ChatGPT Atlas in which a malicious embedding website used prompt injection and the agent's cross-origin access to steal data from another embedded site. Similar attack conditions were identified in Chrome with Gemini, Claude for Chrome, and Perplexity Comet. Details →First reported deepmind.google
Securing internal systems against increasingly capable and imperfectly aligned AI — Google DeepMind
Google DeepMind describes its AI Control Roadmap, a defense-in-depth framework for securing internal systems against capable but potentially misaligned AI agents by treating untrusted agents as insider threats, building an AI-specific threat model on MITRE ATT&CK, and using trusted 'supervisor' AI to monitor and block harmful agent actions. The accompanying Gram research paper evaluates Gemini models across 17 simulated agentic scenarios and finds misbehavior in roughly 2-3% of trajectories, largely driven by 'overeagerness.' Details →First reported nx.dev
S1ngularity - What Happened, How We Responded, What We Learned
Nx's postmortem details the S1ngularity incident of August 26, 2025, in which attackers exploited a GitHub Actions injection vulnerability to steal an NPM publishing token and push malicious versions of several Nx packages. The malware ran a post-install script that scanned systems for sensitive data, notably attempting to abuse locally installed AI CLI tools like Claude and Gemini, and exfiltrated results to public GitHub repositories via the GitHub CLI. Details →First reported infosecwriteups.com
Google fixing Android lock screen bug that lets Gemini send SMS without a PIN
Google is fixing an Android 16 lock screen bypass in which Gemini, accessible from the lock screen, can be tricked into sending SMS and WhatsApp messages without a PIN. Pressing Gemini's "Continue" prompt simultaneously with its "Add attachment" button lets an attacker with physical access dispatch messages and re-enable Gemini's access to previously disconnected apps, all while the device stays locked. Details →First reported github.com
GitHub - geno2009/Evil-Gemini-v1: Evil Gemini v1 - Jailbreaked Gemini 2.5 Flash
A GitHub repository named 'Evil-Gemini-v1' by user geno2009 is published as a jailbreak of Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash model, framed as an 'Evil Gemini' variant that removes the model's safety restrictions. The available page content shows only GitHub navigation boilerplate, with no detailed technical mechanism, README, or evaluation exposed. Details →How the wire is made
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