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First reported 21 Jul · updated 29 Aug · 3 reports embracethered.com

AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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First reported 7 Jul · updated 3 Aug · 7 reports theregister.com

GitLost: How We Tricked GitHub’s AI Agent into Leaking Private Repos - Noma Security

Noma Security disclosed GitLost, an indirect prompt injection attack against GitHub's Agentic Workflows in which an unauthenticated attacker posts a crafted issue on a public org repo and tricks the Claude/Copilot-backed agent into fetching a private repo's README.md and posting it into a public comment. The PoC used an 'Additionally' prefix to reframe output past guardrails and was demonstrated in the sasinomalabs org; it was disclosed to GitHub with no public patch date noted.

First reported 8 Jul · updated 20 Jul · 2 reports arxiv.org

Refused in Chat, Written in Code: Workflow-Level Jailbreak Construction in IDE Coding Agents

Alan Turing Institute researchers Abhishek Kumar and Carsten Maple demonstrated a "workflow-level jailbreak construction" against GitHub Copilot in VS Code, showing that harmful requests refused in direct chat succeed when decomposed across ordinary multi-turn IDE coding tasks. Across 204 prompts from Hammurabi's Code, HarmBench, and AdvBench, four closed-weight backends (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Haiku 4.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Gemini 3.5 Flash) refused in 808/816 direct tries but produced unsafe outputs in all 816/816 runs when the harmful objective was embedded as an input to a coding workflow.

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