First reported youtube.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported youtube.com
Dependency Confusion, Typosquatting, and Slopsquatting: The New Danger of Installing Libraries
A Spanish-language YouTube explainer video covers software supply-chain attacks — dependency confusion, typosquatting, and slopsquatting — with the AI angle that coding assistants can hallucinate nonexistent library names that attackers then register to exploit future model recommendations. The video also discusses lockfiles, hashes, SBOM, SLSA, and best practices for vetting dependencies, and notes it was itself produced with AI assistance for informational purposes. Details →First reported zenity.io
Attackers Target Agents via The Skill Supply Chain | Zenity Labs
Zenity Labs disrupted an active malware campaign that targeted AI agents through typosquatted 'skills' impersonating the Paperclip and Browser Use platforms, using trojanized Python/Node packages and a remote loader to deliver a second-stage credential harvester. The malicious skills accumulated over 1.7M aggregate installs on skills.sh, evaded scanners for weeks, and exfiltrated SSH keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure), and dozens of other secrets to attacker C2 at getpaperclipp[.]com; OWASP subsequently published a candidate Agentic Skills Top 10 with Malicious Skills at No. 1. Details →First reported · updated · 5 reports zscaler.com
Indirect Prompt Injection Targets AI Agents | ThreatLabz
Zscaler ThreatLabz observed two real-world indirect prompt injection (IPI) campaigns that hide malicious instructions inside web content, which is invisible to humans but read and executed by web-enabled AI agents. One campaign was a payment scam directing agents to initiate cryptocurrency payments, and the other used typosquatting to impersonate a cryptocurrency platform; researchers also tested a custom autonomous agent against the sites across multiple LLMs. Details →How the wire is made
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