First reported · updated · 15 reports redhat.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported securityonline.info
CVE-2026-35029 Exploited for Full Server Takeover
CVE-2026-35029, a critical broken access control flaw in the LiteLLM AI gateway (versions before 1.83.0, CVSS 8.8), is being actively exploited to read sensitive files and achieve full server takeover. Attackers abuse the unauthenticated /config/update route to point UI_LOGO_PATH at files like /app/.env or /proc/self/environ and retrieve their plaintext contents via /get_image, and can overwrite admin credentials and register malicious pass-through proxy routes to exfiltrate model API secrets. Honeypot telemetry recorded roughly 3,900 requests from 73 distinct IPs targeting admin routes; the fix is version 1.83.0. Details →First reported feedly.com
CVE-2026-30623 - Exploits & Severity
CVE-2026-30623 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) OS command injection flaw in LiteLLM 1.18.10's MCP server creation feature: the application executes arbitrary command and args values supplied via JSON MCP server configuration without validation. An unauthenticated network attacker can achieve remote code execution with the privileges of the LiteLLM process; patches are available for LiteLLM and related products (DocsGPT, Flowise, Bisheng), while Windsurf and Langchain-Chatchat were reported still vulnerable. Details →First reported embracethered.com
LLM Heist: Hijacking LiteLLM for Traffic Interception, Key Theft, and Tool-Call Injection
Security research from embracethered.com details red-team TTPs for hijacking LiteLLM, a popular AI gateway, to intercept LLM traffic, steal backend provider keys, perform unauthorized inference on the victim's account, and inject forged responses and tool calls downstream of the model. The technique leverages documented gateway-management functionality after compromising an instance via known LiteLLM flaws, including a March 2026 compromised PyPI credential stealer and an Obsidian Security-disclosed privilege-escalation/RCE. Details →First reported redhat.com
CVE-2026-49468 - Red Hat Customer Portal
CVE-2026-49468 is an Important-severity (CVSS 8.1) authentication-bypass flaw in LiteLLM, a proxy server (AI Gateway) used to call LLM APIs. A remote attacker sending a crafted Host header can bypass the proxy authentication layer to gain unauthenticated access to protected management routes, potentially leading to full system compromise. The issue is fixed in LiteLLM v1.84.0 (GHSA-4xpc-pv4p-pm3w), and Red Hat notes its default images do not start the vulnerable proxy. Details →First reported gitlab.com
LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback | GitLab Advisory Database (GLAD)
CVE-2026-59822 is an authentication bypass in LiteLLM's MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint, where the OAuth2 passthrough fallback path replaced failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty UserAPIKeyAuth() object. An unauthenticated attacker could supply an arbitrary/fabricated Bearer token to establish an authenticated MCP session, then list and call configured MCP tools and access connected services. The issue is fixed in LiteLLM v1.84.0. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports darktrace.com
Hackers Compromise AWS AI Gateway Connected to Amazon Bedrock to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer
Darktrace disclosed an incident in which attackers compromised an AWS EC2 instance running LiteLLM-Proxy — an AI gateway centralizing access to Amazon Bedrock foundation models through a privileged IAM role — and deployed XMRig cryptomining malware. The instance had SSH port 22 exposed to all inbound traffic (0.0.0.0/0) and was hit by brute-force attempts, primarily from IP 145.241.123[.]102. Details →First reported nist.gov
NVD - CVE-2026-59819
CVE-2026-59819 is a vulnerability in LiteLLM, an AI gateway/proxy for calling LLM APIs, where prior to version 1.83.10-stable the /health/test_connection endpoint resolved request-supplied environment and OIDC file references in litellm_params, allowing a privileged caller to read arbitrary local files via an oidc/file/ reference (CWE-73). The issue is fixed in version 1.83.10-stable. Details →First reported proofpoint.com
Anthropic Leak & Mercor Attack | Enterprise AI Security Risks | Proofpoint US
Proofpoint reports two April 2026 AI security incidents: an Anthropic leak that exposed internal files and Claude Code source code via a release packaging error, and a Mercor supply-chain attack in which malicious code embedded in the open-source LiteLLM library (used to connect applications to AI services) stole API keys and customer data, attributed to Team PCP within the Lapsus$ group. The piece frames these as evidence that AI security failures are operational and governance failures involving human error, insecure integrations, and compromised dependencies. Details →First reported zenity.io
Attackers Hijack Exposed AI Endpoints to Power Offensive Ops
Zenity researchers observed three distinct campaigns between March and May in which attackers hijacked exposed, unauthenticated self-hosted AI inference endpoints (Ollama's /api/generate and /api/chat on port 11434, and LiteLLM's /v1/responses on port 4000) to power offensive AI operations. Two operators ran autonomous pentesting frameworks (Strix and HexStrike AI) and one used an OpenAI Codex agent with a persona built to suppress safety refusals for web reverse-engineering. Access requires only knowledge of the exposed endpoint, not authentication. Details →How the wire is made
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