First reported youtube.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported · updated · 15 reports redhat.com
Malicious LiteLLM Releases Tied to Trivy Hack May Have Exposed 2,100+ Organizations
TeamPCP compromised the GitHub Actions pipeline of the Trivy scanner used in LiteLLM's CI/CD, stole LiteLLM's PyPI publishing tokens, and published malicious LiteLLM packages (versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8) whose .pth startup-hook payload harvested AI provider credentials, cloud keys, and CI/CD secrets, attempted Kubernetes lateral movement, and installed a systemd backdoor. Hudson Rock obtained a 153GB exfiltration archive attributing 118,829 CI runner dumps to 2,488 corporate domains, and the campaign chains with additional critical LiteLLM CVEs (CVE-2026-33634, CVE-2026-42208, CVE-2026-42271, CVE-2026-48710, CVE-2026-59822), with CVE-2026-42271 added to CISA's KEV catalog. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports medium.com
AI Supply Chain Security in CI/CD Pipelines, a 2026 Playbook
"AI Supply Chain Security in CI/CD Pipelines, a 2026 Playbook" is an analysis piece synthesizing real AI model supply-chain threats, including JFrog's February 2024 discovery of 100+ malicious Hugging Face models exploiting Python pickle deserialization for remote code execution, later PickleScan zero-days that let attackers bypass detection, and malicious Jinja templates hidden in safetensors metadata. The playbook frames how defenders should govern trustworthy AI/model pipelines from data to deployment. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports wiz.io
Red Agent Exploits Snowflake Vuln Created by Copilot Autofix
Wiz's autonomous AI-powered "Red Agent" discovered and exploited a script injection vulnerability in Snowflake's snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net GitHub Actions workflow, where opening a GitHub issue with a crafted title allowed an unauthenticated user to run arbitrary commands in the runner and exfiltrate Jira credentials. The flaw was inadvertently introduced days earlier by GitHub Copilot Autofix, which stripped a sanitized input pattern in favor of direct string interpolation; Snowflake patched it the same day it was reported (June 23, 2026) via its HackerOne program and rotated the exposed token. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports pillar.security
ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution
Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →First reported google.com
A Blueprint for AI-Assisted Vulnerability Management | Google Cloud Blog
Mandiant Consulting's Google Cloud blog offers a blueprint for safely integrating privileged LLM agents into vulnerability management workflows, warning that agents deployed in codebases and CI/CD pipelines introduce architectural risks. It recommends defense-in-depth guardrails, deterministic policy chokepoints, guard models, and treating the codebase as untrusted input because threat actors can embed indirect prompt injections in source comments or dependencies to make agents ignore vulnerabilities or exfiltrate environment variables. Details →First reported crowdstrike.com
Detecting SANDWORM_MODE and AI Toolchain Supply Chain Attacks
CrowdStrike details SANDWORM_MODE, a multi-stage npm supply chain worm first documented by Socket.dev in February 2026 that spanned 19 malicious packages and specifically exploited the runtime behaviors of AI coding assistants (Copilot, Cursor, Claude Code), CI automation, and LLM toolchains. The infection chain uses an obfuscated multi-layer loader (Base64/zlib/XOR, indirect eval) to bypass static analysis, then fingerprints the environment and performs reconnaissance and credential harvesting across the AI-driven CI/CD pipeline. Details →How the wire is made
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