First reported · updated · 4 reports sonarsource.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported · updated · 2 reports zafran.io
Hugging Face Diffusers Flaws Could Let Model Repositories Execute Arbitrary Code
Zafran Labs disclosed three high-severity flaws, collectively named FaceHugger, in Hugging Face's Diffusers library (CVE-2026-44827 CVSS 8.8, CVE-2026-45804 CVSS 7.5, and CVE-2026-44513 CVSS 8.8) that let a malicious model repository silently execute arbitrary code on any machine loading it. The flaws stem from a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use race that bypasses the trust_remote_code safeguard by splitting a model download into two non-atomic HTTP requests, so a routine model load becomes an initial-access vector across CI/CD, container, and production pipelines. Details →First reported barhum.ai
The Hidden Risks of Downloading and Running Open-Source LLMs Locally: Model Formats, Supply-Chain Attacks, and EDR Blind Spots
A Barhum.ai report maps the security attack surface of running open-source LLMs locally, arguing model files are executable artifacts: Python pickle formats (.pt/.pth/.bin) permit arbitrary code execution by design, PickleScan has been bypassed by zero-day vulnerabilities, and inference engines like Ollama have accumulated multiple critical CVEs. It notes CVE-2025-32434 (CVSS 9.3) showed torch.load() with weights_only=True was still exploitable, and highlights that EDR tools are architecturally blind to model-layer threats. Details →How the wire is made
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