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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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