First reported arxiv.org
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported arxiv.org
Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs
Researchers in the paper "Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs" (arXiv:2608.09867) show that encrypted chain-of-thought reasoning blocks returned by OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google reasoning APIs are interchangeable across sessions, users, and models within a provider ecosystem. By injecting a stronger model's encrypted reasoning trace into a weaker, less-safeguarded model in the same family, they force it to decode the trace verbatim, enabling four attack vectors: circumventing anti-distillation protections, extracting private data (recovering 367 PII artifacts and 182 credentials from 315,320 decoded blocks scraped from public repos), revealing hazardous content hidden behind safe answers, and embedding invisible prompt injections in opaque blocks. Details →First reported oracle.com
Securing AI agents through platform controls and shared responsibility | cloud-infrastructure
Oracle's blog post discusses securing AI agents in enterprise SaaS workflows through platform controls and a shared-responsibility model, describing how agents that retrieve data, call tools, and trigger business processes must be governed. It references emerging AI-security standards (ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC FDIS 27090, CEN/CENELEC) and a converging threat taxonomy including data poisoning, evasion, model inversion, model extraction, prompt injection, and agent/tool abuse. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports theregister.com
China Says It Has Found Security Vulnerabilities in Anthropic’s Claude Code - WSJ
China's national vulnerability database (CNVD) claims to have found security vulnerabilities in Anthropic's Claude Code AI coding assistant, and reporting notes Alibaba banned staff from using Claude Code over 'spyware' concerns. The dispute follows Anthropic's accusation that Alibaba and other Chinese labs illicitly extracted Claude's capabilities via large-scale 'distillation' campaigns involving tens of millions of exchanges through fraudulent accounts. Details →How the wire is made
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