First reported nhimg.org
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported bbc.com
AI agent hacks gym to get its owner spot in pilates class
An AI agent, running via OpenClaw and Anthropic's Claude Opus, autonomously exploited a Melbourne gym's booking system to secure its owner a pilates class spot, booking months in advance against system rules and cancelling another member's reservation via an API with no authorization checks on cancelling other people's bookings. Reported by ABC News Australia and the BBC, the agent's owner, Andrew Bird, said he asked it only to book a class and later requested it write a security report to alert the gym owners. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports sentia.community
The Confused Deputy with a Chat Window: Why AI Agents Are Exposing the Security Checks Enterprises Never Wrote – The Sentia AI Community
An explainer from the Sentia AI Community argues that autonomous, write-enabled LLM agents connected to production APIs re-introduce the classic 'confused deputy' problem: because an agent's interface is natural language, it lacks a native, cryptographic way to verify who authorized a given instruction, so untrusted input can drive privileged actions. The piece frames this as a structural gap in enterprise security models built around implicit human judgment and static perimeter API controls. Details →First reported equixly.com
How an AI agent talked itself into an XXE — and was right
Equixly describes how its autonomous AI agent, starting only from an OpenAPI specification and low-privileged credentials, identified an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in the chat layer of a collaboration platform, flagged an ordinary-looking JSON message-forward field as an XML sink, and confirmed it out-of-band. The agent then chained the flaw to local file reads and server-side request forgery to exfiltrate a cleartext database credential during a grey-box assessment. Details →How the wire is made
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