First reported nist.gov
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported ionix.io
CVE-2026-88899 – Remote File Path Traversal / Sandbox Escape – knowns before v0.31.0
CVE-2026-88899 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) external control of file path vulnerability in the `knowns` npm package before v0.31.0, whose `/api/opencode` proxy endpoint fails to validate the `x-opencode-directory` header. Unauthenticated remote attackers can redirect the embedded OpenCode AI agent's file operations to arbitrary host directories (e.g. /root, /etc, ~/.ssh), enabling reading of SSH keys and credentials, writing to shell profiles or cron jobs, and file deletion. The fix in v0.31.0 removed the embedded OpenCode proxy entirely. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports checkpoint.com
From SQLi to RCE - Exploiting LangGraph’s Checkpointer - Check Point Research
Check Point Research (Yarden Porat and Shahar Tal) disclosed 11 vulnerabilities across six major AI agent frameworks — LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, the Microsoft Agent Framework, and Google ADK — including insecure deserialization, SSRF, path traversal, SQL injection, and use-after-free flaws. The most severe were RCE chains: a checkpoint deserialization flaw in the Microsoft Agent Framework triggerable via prompt injection, unauthenticated code execution in Google ADK, and three LangGraph checkpointer bugs (CVE-2025-67644, CVE-2026-28277, CVE-2026-27022). All disclosed issues were patched. Details →First reported nist.gov
NVD - CVE-2026-44192
CVE-2026-44192 is a path-traversal flaw in the Ansible Lightspeed Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that lets an attacker manipulate an AI agent via indirect prompt injection to write files to unauthorized locations. Red Hat rates it CVSS 3.1 base 6.6 (Medium), and successful exploitation can expose sensitive host information and enable malicious command execution leading to full system compromise. Details →First reported sentry.security
Beyond Prompt Injection: Hacking Apple's Private Cloud Compute
Security researcher Drinor found CVE-2026-20685, a path traversal in darwin-init (the PID 1 root provisioning process) of Apple's Private Cloud Compute, the server-side inference backbone of Apple Intelligence. The flaw lets an attacker write files as root during boot and redirect a node's inference telemetry to an attacker-controlled server, breaking PCC's stateless, attested, and sealed-observability privacy guarantees. Apple assigned the CVE and awarded a $150,000 bounty; the researcher found it via Apple's Virtual Research Environment. Details →How the wire is made
Poll & cluster
Internet is crawled for AI security news and near-duplicate coverage is embedded and grouped into durable items.
Curate
AI Agent filters for agentic-AI relevance, classifies and tags each item, scores severity for threats, and writes the summary.
Every item here is one machine-curated intelligence object, not a headline.
Read the wire for free. There is a small charge to ask the index questions.
The wire, open
The complete curated feed, no key required.
- GET /feed.xml — RSS 2.0, every item
- GET /api/items — read-only
The vector desk
Query the index by meaning, not just keyword.
- GET /api/items?tags=&minSeverity=&itemType=
- GET /api/search?q= — keyword
- GET /api/semantic?q= — vector