First reported · updated · 3 reports snyk.io
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported blackduck.com
The AI coding security gap: Why faster development demands stronger guardrails
A Black Duck blog by Steve Smith argues that AI coding assistants accelerate development while multiplying application-security risk, citing a Stanford study finding that developers with AI assistants wrote less secure code and were overconfident about it. The piece outlines root causes of insecure AI-generated code, new attack vectors (including shadow AI and supply-chain risks like slopsquatting), and a seven-layer defensive strategy. Details →First reported cisa.gov
Defending Against an Active Threat to Siemens S7 Series PLCs
Five US federal agencies (NSA, CISA, FBI, DOE, EPA) issued advisory AA26-231A warning of an active threat in which attackers use AI coding assistants together with open source industrial libraries (snap7.dll/python-snap7) to generate custom exploitation scripts disguised as legitimate OT monitoring tools against internet-exposed Siemens S7 Series PLCs at water, energy, manufacturing, and other critical facilities. The AI-generated tools provide read/write access to PLC memory, configuration, and ladder logic via the S7comm protocol, and the activity is suspected to be linked to Iran-affiliated operatives. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports bleepingcomputer.com
Who Vets AI’s Code? The Scale Challenge Facing Open Source Ingestion
A sponsored ActiveState article explains slopsquatting (AI package hallucination exploitation), where LLM coding assistants suggest non-existent package names that attackers then register on PyPI/npm with malicious payloads to be fetched by CI/CD pipelines. It cites a USENIX Security study across 16 code-generation models and 500,000+ samples, and a 2026 example where a hallucinated npm package name (react-codeshift) spread through forks to over 230 repositories. Details →First reported foxnews.com
HalluSquatting attack exploits AI hallucinations to spread malware
The HalluSquatting attack exploits AI hallucinations by registering package or software names that large language models invent when suggesting dependencies, so developers who trust AI-recommended names end up installing attacker-controlled malware. The technique weaponizes the tendency of LLMs to hallucinate plausible-sounding but nonexistent package names. Details →How the wire is made
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