First reported arxiv.org
Lead dispatch
First reported enklypesalt.com
Context Collapse, Part 3 - AI Worming through Word
Security researcher discloses a document-borne AI-worm in Microsoft Copilot for Word, where hidden malicious instructions in an externally shared document are interpreted by Copilot as user requests, causing it to alter drafted documents and copy the instructions into new documents. Those downstream documents become fresh carriers, letting the cross-domain prompt-injection attack self-propagate across trusted document workflows without the original malicious file present. The findings were handled through coordinated disclosure with Microsoft/MSRC over a 144-day period, with reproduction steps and PoC prompts provided.prompt-injection · indirect-prompt-injection · agentic-worm · data-exfiltration · xpia
copilot · llm · ai-agents · microsoft-word
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