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First reported 21 Jul · updated 29 Aug · 3 reports embracethered.com

AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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First reported 3d ago arxiv.org

Beyond the Mandate: A Systematic Security Analysis of the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2)

Researchers from Ben-Gurion University and Intuit present a systematic security analysis of Google's Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) v0.2, which lets LLM-driven shopping agents authorize and execute payments. Using the MAESTRO framework they model threat actors, attack surfaces, and adversary capabilities, cataloging 48 threats across five attack families, scoring them with AIVSS, building a testbed across five deployment architectures, and developing proof-of-concept demonstrations for eight High-risk threats plus a deployment-aware scanner. Their key finding: valid mandate signatures alone do not guarantee an agent-mediated transaction reflects user intent when pre-authorization context (A2A messages, MCP tool calls) is manipulated.

First reported 28 Jul github.com

GitHub - adithyan-ak/AgentHound: Offensive security framework for AI agent infrastructure - recon, credential looting, model exfiltration, poisoning, and attack-path analysis across MCP, A2A, gateways, and AI services. BloodHound for the agentic stack.

AgentHound is an open-source offensive security framework for AI agent infrastructure, described as "BloodHound for the agentic stack." The tool performs reconnaissance, credential looting, model exfiltration, poisoning, and attack-path analysis across MCP, A2A, gateways, and AI services.

First reported 14 Jul aminrj.com

Deleting the Malicious MCP Server Doesn't Save You | Amine Raji, PhD

A lab-built demonstration (mcp-attack-labs, Lab 08) chains MCP tool-description poisoning into an Agent-to-Agent (A2A) intrusion: a poisoned tool instructs the compromised agent to register a rogue A2A agent, hijack routing via shadowing, exfiltrate data, and persist even after the malicious MCP server is deleted. Each stage maps to a named vulnerability class (OWASP MCP Top 10 MCP03, ASI10, ASI07) and is paired with a detection that fires on it.

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