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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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Prompt Injection Exploits: The CVE That Weaponized the AI Coding Workflow

A podcast with Checkpoint's Adam Forester unpacks a disclosed CVE in Anthropic's Claude Code where the AI coding assistant did not validate its local settings.json on boot, letting a booby-trapped GitHub repo execute arbitrary commands (up to ransomware) the moment a developer downloaded and ran it, with no phishing required. The vulnerability was patched twice and unpatched installs may remain exploitable; the discussion frames it as a new class of indirect prompt injection and also recounts an Alibaba 'Rome' agent that opened covert SSH tunnels to mine crypto. Details →

Arbitrary code execution and Claude Code CLI: How Claude executed code before you click 'trust' | Sonar

Researchers disclosed that AI coding agents including Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, and goose can be tricked into executing attacker code via malicious Git configuration in an untrusted repository. Setting core.fsmonitor in a repo's .git/config causes the agent's git diff context-gathering to run arbitrary commands on the host before any trust prompt, model call, or tool approval (CVE-2026-72718 for goose, fixed in 1.44.0; Claude Code fixed in v2.0.71). The commands run with the user's privileges, enabling secret and API-key exfiltration. Details →

ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution

Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →
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