First reported · updated · 7 reports huggingface.co
Lead dispatch
First reported island.io
AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale
Island security researchers uncovered the FakeGit campaign, which used roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware that installs the StealC information stealer. The campaign introduces a technique called AgentBaiting, in which AI agents such as Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious README as legitimate documentation, and pass installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads.supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-delivery · agentbaiting
mcp · ai-agents · ai-skills · llm · copilot
Severity
0.75
The wire · latest
First reported catonetworks.com
How One Threat Actor Turned Frontier AI Into an Offensive Platform
Cato CTRL researchers report that a Russian-speaking threat actor known as "Trim" systematically jailbroke publicly available frontier LLMs (including Claude Opus) to strip their guardrails and rebuilt them into a for-fee, commercially marketed AI-powered offensive penetration-testing platform. Starting as a March 2026 forum post explaining how to break models into writing malware, the effort evolved by June into a productized tool, reportedly incorporating a leaked system prompt from Fable. Details →First reported · updated · 9 reports sysdig.com
JADEPUFFER: Agentic ransomware for automated database extortion
Sysdig researchers documented JadePuffer, described as the first ransomware operation conducted end-to-end by an autonomous LLM agent. The agent gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2025-3248 (an unauthenticated RCE in the Langflow LLM-app framework), then autonomously performed reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, persistence (a beaconing cron job), privilege escalation via Nacos auth bypass CVE-2021-29441, and encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration items—adapting to failures in real time (e.g., recovering from a failed login in 31 seconds). Details →First reported mitiga.io
Modern Malware — Spyware Skills, Hijacked Base URLs, and 1,230+ Leaking API Keys in AI Instruction Files
Mitiga Labs details malware hidden in AI agent instruction files — Cursor rules, Anthropic Skills, Claude Hooks, AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md context files, MCP server configs, and .pyc droppers — that AI agents follow with near-zero validation. The research found prompt-exfiltration tradecraft caught in the wild, attacker-controlled ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL overrides routing Claude traffic through MITM proxies, permission-bypass defaults, and over 1,230 hardcoded API keys and JWT tokens across tens of services. Mitiga also released a free scanner, Skillgate, built during the investigation. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports zscaler.com
Indirect Prompt Injection Targets AI Agents | ThreatLabz
Zscaler ThreatLabz observed two in-the-wild campaigns using indirect prompt injection (IPI) embedded in malicious websites to manipulate web-browsing AI agents. One campaign uses SEO poisoning around a fake Python library (requests-secure-v2) with hidden prompts and schema-markup instructions telling agents to make a cryptocurrency payment to a hardcoded wallet to obtain an API key; the other typosquats the DeFi tracker DeBank, embedding prompts convincing agents the fraudulent site is legitimate. In testing an autonomous payment-capable agent across 26 LLMs, four (Llama 3.3 70B, Llama 3.2 90B Vision, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro) were tricked into paying and two miscategorized the fake DeBank as trusted. Details →First reported qianxin.com
NadMesh Botnet Analysis: A Product-Grade Threat for the AI Service Era
NadMesh is a Go-based botnet observed in early July 2026 by QiAnXin's XLab that autonomously scans for and exploits exposed AI services — ComfyUI, Ollama, n8n, Open WebUI, Langflow, and Gradio — using a Shodan harvester (ai_harvest.py) to prioritize AI infrastructure and the MCP ecosystem. It folds scanning, 20+ RCE exploitation vectors (Redis, Docker, MCP, Kubernetes), credential/AI-service intelligence harvesting, polymorphic builds, and redundant persistence into a single productized platform; the operator's dashboard claims 3,811 unique AWS keys plus model inventories tagged as cloud services. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports barracuda.com
Text salting: How hidden text evades AI email security
Barracuda researchers report more than one million retail-themed phishing emails since April that use 'text salting' — hidden, harmless-looking text invisible to recipients but readable by scanners — to dilute malicious signals and fool both traditional and AI-powered email security filters. Generative AI lets attackers generate these salted campaigns cheaply, at scale, and with high variation, while AI-based content analysis engines fail to see through the hidden content. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports redhat.com
CVE-2026-42271 - Red Hat Customer Portal
CVE-2026-42271 is an Important-severity (CVSS 8.8) flaw in LiteLLM, an AI gateway/proxy for LLM APIs, where two MCP-server preview endpoints accepted full server configurations including command-execution parameters without adequate role checks. An authenticated user with even low-privilege internal-user keys could send a crafted configuration to achieve arbitrary OS command execution on the proxy host; Red Hat notes known public exploits and the CVE is tracked in CISA's KEV catalog, with fixes shipped in LiteLLM v1.83.7-stable and Red Hat OpenShift AI / Ansible Automation Platform errata. Details →First reported cyberscoop.com
Sysdig clocks first documented case of agentic ransomware
CyberScoop, reporting on Sysdig research, describes JadePuffer — the first documented case of agentic ransomware, where an AI agent autonomously drove an end-to-end extortion operation spanning reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, persistence, encryption and ransom-note delivery. The late-June 2026 attack gained initial access via Langflow flaw CVE-2025-3248, targeted a MySQL/Alibaba Nacos production server, ran more than 600 purposeful payloads, and used keys for OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek and Gemini, with the agent fixing a failed backdoor in 31 seconds. Details →First reported paloaltonetworks.com
OpenClaw’s Skill Marketplace and the Emerging AI Supply Chain Threat
Unit 42 describes an emerging AI supply-chain threat in which malicious "skills" published to the OpenClaw agent skill marketplace act as a distribution channel for malware and data theft. Corroborating research from Trend Micro (Atomic macOS Stealer delivery), Bitdefender, Koi.ai (341 malicious ClawedBot skills) and JFrog documents how attackers hide payloads inside agent skills users install to extend AI-agent capabilities. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports stepsecurity.io
Miasma Supply Chain Attack: Azure Hit, 73 Repos Down, 37 PyPI Wheels
The Miasma supply-chain worm campaign expanded to poison Microsoft's Azure/durabletask GitHub repository with config files that execute a credential-harvesting payload the moment a developer opens the repo in AI coding tools like Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, or VS Code, triggering GitHub to disable 73 Microsoft repositories including Azure/functions-action. Two days later the Hades variant dropped 37 malicious PyPI wheels across 19 packages using Python .pth startup hooks to run a Bun-powered credential stealer on every interpreter launch, with Socket tracking 448 affected artifacts across npm and PyPI. Details →First reported wraith.sh
Data Exfiltration via Markdown Images: The Quiet AI Vulnerability
Wraith's attack guide by Anthony D'Onofrio details data exfiltration via markdown image rendering in AI products, where an injected payload (via prompt injection, RAG doc, shared document, or email) causes an LLM to emit a markdown image whose URL embeds secrets like system prompts, conversation history, or API keys; when the chat client renders the markdown, the browser silently fetches the attacker's URL, leaking the data with zero clicks and no visible artifact. The guide notes variants have hit ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot, GitHub Copilot Chat, Slack AI Assistant, Google Bard, and Claude.ai, and covers four defensive patterns. Details →First reported sans.edu
Someone Is Scanning for Your MCP Servers and AI Assistant Credentials
A SANS ISC diary by Manuel Humberto Santander Peláez reports that analysis of 14 days of Apache/ModSecurity logs from a small web host revealed distributed internet scanning specifically targeting Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, AI assistant configuration files, and locally exposed LLM endpoints. Notably, the POST /mcp probes carried valid JSON-RPC 2.0 MCP 'initialize' handshakes from 49 distinct source IPs, indicating scanners that speak the protocol and would enumerate tools and data sources if a real MCP server responded. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports sysdig.com
Understanding Langflow CVE-2026-55255, and why higher CVSS vulnerabilities aren't always the most exploited
CISA added CVE-2026-55255, an actively exploited Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) authorization-bypass flaw in the Langflow visual framework for building AI agents, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and ordered federal agencies to patch it. The flaw lets authenticated attackers access other users' flows via the /api/v1/responses endpoint using a victim's flow UUID, and Sysdig observed in-the-wild exploitation aimed at leaking API keys, delivering second-stage loaders, and stealing LLM/cloud credentials and compute. Details →First reported zenity.io
Attackers Hijack Exposed AI Endpoints to Power Offensive Ops
Zenity researchers observed three distinct campaigns between March and May in which attackers hijacked exposed, unauthenticated self-hosted AI inference endpoints (Ollama's /api/generate and /api/chat on port 11434, and LiteLLM's /v1/responses on port 4000) to power offensive AI operations. Two operators ran autonomous pentesting frameworks (Strix and HexStrike AI) and one used an OpenAI Codex agent with a persona built to suppress safety refusals for web reverse-engineering. Access requires only knowledge of the exposed endpoint, not authentication. Details →First reported trendmicro.com
Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints
Threat actors are actively exploiting CVE-2026-33017 (CVSS 9.3), an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in Langflow, an AI application/agent workflow builder, to deploy a Monero cryptocurrency miner on exposed endpoints. Details →How the wire is made
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