First reported · updated · 7 reports varonis.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported · updated · 2 reports checkpoint.com
From SQLi to RCE - Exploiting LangGraph’s Checkpointer - Check Point Research
Check Point Research (Yarden Porat and Shahar Tal) disclosed 11 vulnerabilities across six major AI agent frameworks — LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, the Microsoft Agent Framework, and Google ADK — including insecure deserialization, SSRF, path traversal, SQL injection, and use-after-free flaws. The most severe were RCE chains: a checkpoint deserialization flaw in the Microsoft Agent Framework triggerable via prompt injection, unauthenticated code execution in Google ADK, and three LangGraph checkpointer bugs (CVE-2025-67644, CVE-2026-28277, CVE-2026-27022). All disclosed issues were patched. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports pillar.security
ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution
Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →First reported sentry.security
Beyond Prompt Injection: Hacking Apple's Private Cloud Compute
Security researcher Drinor found CVE-2026-20685, a path traversal in darwin-init (the PID 1 root provisioning process) of Apple's Private Cloud Compute, the server-side inference backbone of Apple Intelligence. The flaw lets an attacker write files as root during boot and redirect a node's inference telemetry to an attacker-controlled server, breaking PCC's stateless, attested, and sealed-observability privacy guarantees. Apple assigned the CVE and awarded a $150,000 bounty; the researcher found it via Apple's Virtual Research Environment. Details →First reported embracethered.com
From Indirect Prompt Injection to DNS Exfiltration in macOS Terminal
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) demonstrates a proof-of-concept where an indirect prompt injection hidden in a spreadsheet cell hijacks an LLM-integrated CLI tool to emit ANSI escape codes, which the macOS Terminal app interprets to issue DNS requests that exfiltrate data from other rows. Building on prior Terminal DiLLMa research and David Leadbeater's original finding, the post reports that Apple has fixed the macOS Terminal behavior enabling the DNS-based exfiltration. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports paloaltonetworks.com
Pickle in the Middle – Hijacking Vertex AI Model Uploads for Cross-Tenant RCE
Palo Alto Unit 42 (Ori Hadad) disclosed CVE-2026-0257, a flaw in Google's Vertex AI Python SDK (python-aiplatform) where model uploads relied on an attacker-predictable Google Cloud Storage bucket, enabling 'bucket squatting.' An attacker could pre-register the expected bucket and substitute a malicious pickle/joblib model artifact, achieving cross-tenant remote code execution when the poisoned model was deserialized. Google fixed the issue in SDK releases v1.148.0/v1.148.1. Details →First reported arxiv.org
A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →First reported microsoft.com
AutoJack: How a single page can RCE the host running your AI agent | Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft researchers disclosed AutoJack, an exploit chain in AutoGen Studio where untrusted web content rendered by a browsing agent can reach a local MCP WebSocket and spawn arbitrary processes on the host, crossing the localhost trust boundary to achieve RCE. The issue was reported to MSRC and hardened upstream in commit b047730; the vulnerable MCP WebSocket surface was never shipped in a PyPI release. Details →How the wire is made
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