First reported youtube.com
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 3 reports embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide
Severity
0.85
The wire · latest
First reported trendmicro.com
Vibe Hacking: Two AI-Augmented Campaigns Target Government and Financial Sectors in Latin America | Trend Micro (US)
Unit 42 and Trend Micro report two distinct threat campaigns (tracked as SHADOW-AETHER-040/CL-CRI-1131 and SHADOW-AETHER-064/CL-CRI-1163) that used agentic AI command-line tools to drive intrusion operations against government, financial, aviation, and retail organizations across Latin America. Exposed C2 data revealed conversations between the actors and their AI agents, which dynamically generated bespoke hacking tools and scripts and tunneled traffic into victim networks via ProxyChains, SSH, Chisel, Neo-reGeorg, CrackMapExec, and Impacket, executing attacks from initial access to data exfiltration. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports sonarsource.com
Arbitrary code execution and Claude Code CLI: How Claude executed code before you click 'trust' | Sonar
Researchers disclosed that AI coding agents including Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, and goose can be tricked into executing attacker code via malicious Git configuration in an untrusted repository. Setting core.fsmonitor in a repo's .git/config causes the agent's git diff context-gathering to run arbitrary commands on the host before any trust prompt, model call, or tool approval (CVE-2026-72718 for goose, fixed in 1.44.0; Claude Code fixed in v2.0.71). The commands run with the user's privileges, enabling secret and API-key exfiltration. Details →First reported · updated · 4 reports embracethered.com
Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) demonstrated an indirect prompt injection attack chain that hijacks Claude Code Opus 5 in Auto Mode via a simple 'summarize this website' request, achieving code execution with a 60-80% success rate. The chain nudges Claude from WebFetch to curl, downloads a ZIP whose extracted malicious struct.py shadows Python's standard module, so importing base64 triggers attacker code; in some runs Auto Mode's safety classifier even blocked Claude's own cleanup command. The result contrasts with a vendor-commissioned evaluation (Trajectory Labs) that reported 0.00% attack success for Opus 5 in Auto Mode. Details →First reported immersivelabs.com
Claude Code RCE: How a Malicious PR Triggers Code Execution
Immersive Labs describes a Claude Code remote code execution vulnerability in which a malicious pull request can trigger code execution when the AI coding agent processes the repository. The attack leverages attacker-controlled content in a PR to coerce the agent into executing code on the host. Details →First reported · updated · 6 reports wiz.io
GhostApproval: AI Coding Assistant Trust Boundary Flaw
Wiz disclosed GhostApproval, a vulnerability pattern in 6 top AI coding assistants (Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, Windsurf) where a malicious repository uses a symlink (CWE-61) disguised as an ordinary file so the agent writes attacker-controlled content — such as an SSH key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys — outside the workspace sandbox, potentially achieving RCE. In several cases (notably Claude Code) the agent's internal reasoning recognized the dangerous target while the human-in-the-loop confirmation dialog concealed it (CWE-451). CVEs including CVE-2026-12958 and CVE-2026-50549 were assigned; AWS, Cursor, and Google fixed the issue, while others went silent or declined it as outside their threat model. Details →First reported theregister.com
ChainDrop worm crawls into npm supply chain, evades standard defenses
ChainDrop, a new variant of the Shai-Hulud npm worm dubbed by Microsoft and others, has poisoned 444 packages (collectively downloaded ~2 billion times a month, including keyv, flat-cache and cache-manager) and self-replicates by rebuilding package tarballs to embed its payload rather than committing to source repos. It harvests npm tokens, cloud keys and secrets from shell configs, environment variables and live memory, and plants startup hooks in repo config files so that simply opening an infected Git branch in VS Code or Claude Code triggers execution without any npm install. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports pillar.security
ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution
Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →First reported corgea.com
CVE-2026-55607 vulnerability: npm/@anthropic-ai/cl…
CVE-2026-55607 is a vulnerability affecting the npm package @anthropic-ai/claude-code, Anthropic's AI coding agent, tracked via GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv and NVD, with a fix referenced in the v2.1.163 release. The Corgea page is an advisory catalog entry pointing to the upstream advisory and NVD record. Details →First reported tenetsecurity.ai
A public Sentry key is all it takes to hijack Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex
Researchers at Tenet Security describe "agentjacking," an attack in which a publicly exposed Sentry key lets an attacker inject fake error messages that AI coding agents such as Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex ingest via the Sentry MCP server. The crafted error content acts as an indirect prompt injection, hijacking the agent to execute attacker-directed actions; the team also published a mitigation tool, agent-jackstop, on GitHub. Details →First reported mitiga.io
MCP Token Theft in Claude Code: A Man-in-the-Middle Attack Chain
Mitiga Labs research details a man-in-the-middle attack chain against Claude Code in which a user-level post-install hook rewrites MCP server endpoints in ~/.claude.json to route MCP traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure and steal OAuth tokens for connected SaaS (Jira, Confluence, GitHub, etc.). Because provider-side audit logs still show valid OAuth traffic from Anthropic's trusted egress range, the malicious activity blends in as legitimate user actions, and token rotation fails to break the chain while the hook keeps reseeding the config. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports stepsecurity.io
Miasma Supply Chain Attack: Azure Hit, 73 Repos Down, 37 PyPI Wheels
The Miasma supply-chain worm campaign expanded to poison Microsoft's Azure/durabletask GitHub repository with config files that execute a credential-harvesting payload the moment a developer opens the repo in AI coding tools like Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, or VS Code, triggering GitHub to disable 73 Microsoft repositories including Azure/functions-action. Two days later the Hades variant dropped 37 malicious PyPI wheels across 19 packages using Python .pth startup hooks to run a Bun-powered credential stealer on every interpreter launch, with Socket tracking 448 affected artifacts across npm and PyPI. Details →First reported ainowinstitute.org
Friendly Fire: Hijacking Defensive Cyber AI Agents for Remote Code Execution
The AI Now Institute published an exploit brief and PoC (GitHub: Boyan-MILANOV/friendly-fire-ai-agent-exploit) demonstrating remote code execution against Anthropic's Claude Code CLI (auto-mode) and OpenAI's Codex CLI (auto-review) when these defensive coding agents are used to assess third-party or open-source libraries. The attack embeds prompt injections across a library's source code to hijack the AI agent, requiring no hooks, skills, plugins, MCP servers, or config files as an injection vector. Details →First reported 0din.ai
Mozilla Shows the Danger of Indirect Prompt Injections in AI Coding Agents
Mozilla 0DIN researchers Andre Hall and Miller Engelbrecht demonstrated a proof-of-concept attack where a clean GitHub repository with no malicious code uses indirect prompt injection to trick AI coding agents like Anthropic's Claude Code into chaining routine actions that grant an attacker shell command access and persistence. The malicious payload never appears in the repository; instead it is pulled at runtime from DNS after the agent blindly trusts the repo, evading scanners and human review. Details →How the wire is made
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