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Capability Gates Are Not Authorization: Confused-Deputy Failures in LLM Agent Frameworks

A security research paper, 'Capability Gates Are Not Authorization,' audits LangChain/LangGraph, LlamaIndex, and the Stripe Agent Toolkit and finds that all three provide capability gating by default but none enforce a deterministic fail-closed per-call value authorization gate, enabling classic confused-deputy abuse where an attacker-influenced model emits an unauthorized side-effecting call (e.g., a payout). The authors introduce SCOPEGATE, a five-stage PDP/PEP control (scope, authorization, money ceiling, idempotency, default deny), and report an identical unauthorized payout executing under LangChain's default dispatch but denied by SCOPEGATE, with an available artifact (github.com/raceksd-source/scopegate-runtime). Details →

Confused Deputy Attack Against Model Context Protocol | ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology

An ACM TOSEM paper uncovers the "confused deputy attack" against the Model Context Protocol (MCP), where an adversarial server with subtly manipulated metadata overshadows a benign server and intercepts tool invocations without overt malicious behavior. The authors built Puppet, an automated evaluation framework that rewrites benign tool descriptions to hijack tool selection, achieving hijacking rates up to 90.89% and payload execution up to 86.46% across 14 models, while evading MCP-Scan and McpSafetyScanner which cannot detect metadata-level manipulation. Details →

Solving GitHub’s Secure Code game with an AI red teaming agent

Adversa AI documents pointing its autonomous AI Red Teaming Agent at GitHub's open-source Secure Code Game 'ProdBot' challenge, an intentionally vulnerable agentic-AI teaching target where the goal is to coax the agent into leaking a flag stored one directory above its sandbox. The agent cleared the first three levels (Sandbox, Web, MCP) at full score in a single 57-second run, relying on 'context seeding' — fabricating a plausible prior workflow implying authentication had already occurred — rather than overt jailbreak language, illustrating that each added capability (web browsing, MCP tool chains, skills, multi-agent) opens a new attack surface via indirect injection, poisoned tool chains, and confused-deputy trust. Details →
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