Research
Defensive Sufficiency in a Stackelberg Model of AI Security
Publication date unknown · Discovered arxiv.org
Page published
Publication date unknown · First observed: 14 Oct 2026
Coverage timeline
Single-source research — one report is available.
Why it matters
The Stackelberg model gives defenders a formal framework for reasoning about when investment in discovery-and-repair feedback loops economically deters attacks on LLM agents facing prompt injection and jailbreak threats.
"Defensive Sufficiency in a Stackelberg Model of AI Security" by Majumdar and Chavan presents a game-theoretic model analyzing when automated testing, red teaming, and incident-response feedback provide sufficient protection for LLM-driven AI systems against attacks like indirect prompt injection and many-shot jailbreaking. The paper derives completion-time bounds for defending finite and growing attack surfaces and formulates a defender-led Stackelberg game characterizing least-cost investment in proactive discovery and reactive repair.