Research · curated 22 Aug 2026
MAPLE-Guard: Memory-Aware Link EnforcementAgainst Memory-Link Poisoning in Multi-Agent Systems
First reported arxiv.org
Coverage timeline
Single-source research — first reported, latest, and curated coincide.
Why it matters
MAPLE-Guard addresses a durable and stealthy attack channel — poisoned persistent memory that contaminates multiple agents without any malicious message crossing a visible communication edge — which existing prompt- and topology-level defenses miss.
MAPLE-Guard is a defense presented in an arXiv paper against memory-link poisoning in LLM-based multi-agent systems, where a single poisoned memory write can be retrieved, promoted into shared memory, and reused by agents that never saw the original attack. The guard places gates at write, retrieval, promotion, and cross-agent reuse, reportedly lowering attack success rate from 38.2% to 0.9% on LongMemEval and 34.7% to 0.2% on AppWorld, with code released on GitHub.