First reported · updated · 3 reports appsentinels.ai
Lead dispatch
First reported island.io
AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale
Island security researchers uncovered the FakeGit campaign, which used roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware that installs the StealC information stealer. The campaign introduces a technique called AgentBaiting, in which AI agents such as Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious README as legitimate documentation, and pass installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads.supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-delivery · agentbaiting
mcp · ai-agents · ai-skills · llm · copilot
Severity
0.75
The wire · latest
First reported swarmnetics.com
Agentjacking and MCP trust: are AI coding agents too easy to steer?
Agentjacking, described by Swarmnetics and Tenet Security, abuses trusted error-report inputs in AI coding agents: an attacker with a publicly exposed Sentry DSN can inject malicious instructions into telemetry that the agent processes, steering it to exfiltrate secrets such as cloud keys, Git credentials, and private repo URLs. The root flaw is that these systems treat source trust as if it equals action trust, letting external report text become executable guidance. Details →First reported tenetsecurity.ai
A public Sentry key is all it takes to hijack Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex
Researchers at Tenet Security describe "agentjacking," an attack in which a publicly exposed Sentry key lets an attacker inject fake error messages that AI coding agents such as Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex ingest via the Sentry MCP server. The crafted error content acts as an indirect prompt injection, hijacking the agent to execute attacker-directed actions; the team also published a mitigation tool, agent-jackstop, on GitHub. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports theregister.com
GitLost: How We Tricked GitHub’s AI Agent into Leaking Private Repos - Noma Security
Noma Security's "GitLost" research demonstrated that GitHub Agentic Workflows (AI agents backed by Claude or Copilot) could be tricked via indirect prompt injection: an unauthenticated attacker posts a crafted issue on a public org repo, and the agent fetches a private repo's README and posts it in a public comment. The PoC used an "Additionally" prefix to bypass guardrails and was disclosed to GitHub with no public patch date noted. Details →First reported infosecwriteups.com
Google fixing Android lock screen bug that lets Gemini send SMS without a PIN
Google is fixing an Android 16 lock screen bypass in which Gemini, accessible from the lock screen, can be tricked into sending SMS and WhatsApp messages without a PIN. Pressing Gemini's "Continue" prompt simultaneously with its "Add attachment" button lets an attacker with physical access dispatch messages and re-enable Gemini's access to previously disconnected apps, all while the device stays locked. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports manifold.security
ClaudeBleed Reopened: Browser Extensions Can Still Push Claude for Chrome to Read Your Gmail
Manifold Security researcher Ax Sharma disclosed two unpatched vulnerabilities in Anthropic's Claude for Chrome extension (v1.0.80). Any browser extension with a content script on claude.ai can inject a DOM element and dispatch a synthetic click that Claude treats as a legitimate user action, triggering one of nine hardcoded workflows that read Gmail, Google Docs, and Calendar or act on Salesforce; a second flaw initializes the side panel in privileged mode via a ?skipPermissions=true URL parameter with no consent. Rated CVSS 7.7 in default mode and 9.6 Critical when 'Act without asking' is enabled, and reportedly still reproducible after eight releases since being reported to Anthropic in May. Details →First reported mitiga.io
MCP Token Theft in Claude Code: A Man-in-the-Middle Attack Chain
Mitiga Labs research details a man-in-the-middle attack chain against Claude Code in which a user-level post-install hook rewrites MCP server endpoints in ~/.claude.json to route MCP traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure and steal OAuth tokens for connected SaaS (Jira, Confluence, GitHub, etc.). Because provider-side audit logs still show valid OAuth traffic from Anthropic's trusted egress range, the malicious activity blends in as legitimate user actions, and token rotation fails to break the chain while the hook keeps reseeding the config. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports tenetsecurity.ai
Fake Bug Report Hijacks AI Coding Agents at Scale
Tenet Security demonstrated "agentjacking," an indirect prompt-injection technique in which an attacker plants a single fake error report in a public bug-tracking service (Sentry) that hijacks AI coding agents into running attacker-controlled code on a developer's machine. In controlled testing, widely used assistants including Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex retrieved the poisoned error data and, in many cases, executed the code, opening a path to theft of cloud credentials, AWS keys, GitHub tokens, SSH keys, and CI/CD secrets. Details →First reported ainowinstitute.org
Friendly Fire: Hijacking Defensive Cyber AI Agents for Remote Code Execution
The AI Now Institute published an exploit brief and PoC (GitHub: Boyan-MILANOV/friendly-fire-ai-agent-exploit) demonstrating remote code execution against Anthropic's Claude Code CLI (auto-mode) and OpenAI's Codex CLI (auto-review) when these defensive coding agents are used to assess third-party or open-source libraries. The attack embeds prompt injections across a library's source code to hijack the AI agent, requiring no hooks, skills, plugins, MCP servers, or config files as an injection vector. Details →First reported simonwillison.net
Microsoft Warns Poisoned MCP Tool Descriptions Can Make AI Agents Leak Data
Microsoft research describes how attackers can poison MCP tool descriptions to hijack AI agents into quietly exfiltrating company data to an outsider, without the agent visibly breaking any rule so default setups raise no alarm. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports adversa.ai
GuardFall: a universal shell injection vulnerability in open-source AI agents
Adversa AI research describes GuardFall, a bypass of AI coding agents' safety filters using decades-old shell injection tricks to execute dangerous commands. The bypass reportedly worked against 10 of 11 tested popular open-source coding and computer-use agents, with only 'Continue' being resistant. Details →How the wire is made
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