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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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Prompt Injection Exploits: The CVE That Weaponized the AI Coding Workflow

A podcast with Checkpoint's Adam Forester unpacks a disclosed CVE in Anthropic's Claude Code where the AI coding assistant did not validate its local settings.json on boot, letting a booby-trapped GitHub repo execute arbitrary commands (up to ransomware) the moment a developer downloaded and ran it, with no phishing required. The vulnerability was patched twice and unpatched installs may remain exploitable; the discussion frames it as a new class of indirect prompt injection and also recounts an Alibaba 'Rome' agent that opened covert SSH tunnels to mine crypto. Details →

Arbitrary code execution and Claude Code CLI: How Claude executed code before you click 'trust' | Sonar

Researchers disclosed that AI coding agents including Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, and goose can be tricked into executing attacker code via malicious Git configuration in an untrusted repository. Setting core.fsmonitor in a repo's .git/config causes the agent's git diff context-gathering to run arbitrary commands on the host before any trust prompt, model call, or tool approval (CVE-2026-72718 for goose, fixed in 1.44.0; Claude Code fixed in v2.0.71). The commands run with the user's privileges, enabling secret and API-key exfiltration. Details →

Amazon Kiro: AI Is Breaking Vulnerability Disclosure Processes

Mindgard disclosed a prompt-injection vulnerability in Amazon Kiro, an AI-powered agentic IDE, that lets attacker-controlled repository content coerce the Kiro agent into reading local sensitive data, modifying a workspace URL, and triggering an outbound request that exfiltrates the secret. The flaw was reproduced in Kiro IDE 0.7.45 on Windows in both trusted and untrusted workspaces via Kiro Powers (MCP configs and POWER.md steering files); exploitation requires the user open a malicious workspace file and message the agent, and is assessed as low difficulty. Details →

NVD - CVE-2026-62676

CVE-2026-62676 is a HIGH-severity (CVSS 7.1) flaw in Omnigent, an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in _shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, timeout/nice/setsid/stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a background control operator, so a gated git push or gh write hidden in these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the repo/branch allowlist and workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace; fixed in version 0.3.0. Details →

ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution

Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →

AWS, Google, and Vercel Agent Flaws Let Attackers Trigger Tools Without Running the Model

Security flaws in agent infrastructure from AWS (Bedrock AgentCore's InvokeHarness API), Google (Agent Development Kit for Python), and Vercel (AI SDK harness packages for Codex and OpenCode) allow untrusted or forged instructions to reach an agent's tools without verifying that a model turn authorized them. In several attack paths the model never ran, so system prompts, content filters, and model-level guardrails never engaged. AWS fixed the managed service, Google addressed the issues in ADK 2.5.0, and Vercel patched @ai-sdk/harness-codex 1.0.29 and @ai-sdk/harness-opencode 1.0.28. Details →

Paperclip AI Flaws Let Attackers Run Host Commands via Malicious Agent Imports

Two flaws in Paperclip, an open-source control plane for teams of AI agents, let attackers execute host commands by importing and starting a malicious agent. The server-side path CVE-2026-41679 (CVSS 10.0) needs no account or victim interaction against authenticated deployments with default registration, while GHSA-x8hx-rhr2-9rf7 (CVSS 9.6) triggers when a user opens an attacker-controlled page in default local_trusted mode; a third flaw exposed sensitive data via API routes lacking access checks. Version v2026.416.0 adds import-authorization and hostname-validation fixes. Details →

A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →
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