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AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale

Island security researchers uncovered the FakeGit campaign, which used roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware that installs the StealC information stealer. The campaign introduces a technique called AgentBaiting, in which AI agents such as Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious README as legitimate documentation, and pass installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads.

supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-delivery · agentbaiting
mcp · ai-agents · ai-skills · llm · copilot

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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

AWS Kiro, an agentic coding IDE, was vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via indirect prompt injection: hidden text on a web page (or a comment in a source file) processed by the agent could make Kiro use its no-approval fsWrite tool to rewrite ~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json (or allowlist all Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json), causing it to launch attacker-specified MCP servers/commands and achieve RCE on the developer's machine, bypassing the human 'allow' approval boundary. Discovered by Intezer with Kodem Security and independently by Embrace The Red (Johann Rehberger); AWS has patched the issue. Details →

SearchLeak: How We Turned M365 Copilot Into a One-Click Data Exfiltration Weapon

SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) is a critical three-stage vulnerability chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise discovered by Varonis Threat Labs that lets an attacker steal MFA codes, emails, meeting details, and organizational files with a single click on a trusted microsoft.com link. It chains a Parameter-to-Prompt (P2P) injection via the search q parameter with an HTML rendering race condition and a CSP bypass through Bing's allowlisted image-search SSRF endpoint to silently exfiltrate a victim's mailbox, calendar, SharePoint, and OneDrive data. Microsoft remediated the flaw and rated it critical. Details →

One-Click Data Exfiltration via rovoChatPrompt URL Parameter (Confluence / Rovo) - CrowdStream

A disclosed and now-patched vulnerability in Atlassian Rovo, the default AI assistant across Confluence and other Atlassian products, allowed the `rovoChatPrompt` URL parameter to preload an arbitrary prompt into a victim's Rovo chat. When an authenticated user clicked a crafted link, Rovo executed the embedded prompt as a genuine query, using indirect task-framed language ('help me identify this image') to bypass guardrails and exfiltrate Confluence pages, secrets, and connected-app data (Jira, SharePoint, Outlook) to an attacker host via an image-fetch URL. Atlassian remediated the issue server-side and the reporter validated the fix. Details →

DuneSlide: Two Critical RCE vulnerabilities

Cato AI Labs disclosed two critical vulnerabilities in Cursor IDE, dubbed DuneSlide (CVE-2026-50548 and CVE-2026-50549, both CVSS 9.8), that allow zero-click prompt injection to escape the editor's command sandbox and achieve remote code execution. CVE-2026-50548 abuses the run_terminal_cmd tool's working_directory parameter to add attacker-chosen folders to the allowed-write list, letting an attacker overwrite the cursorsandbox binary or shell startup files and turn sandboxed commands into full system compromise. Cursor patched both in version 3.0, released April 2; earlier 2.x builds remain exposed. Details →

A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →
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