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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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Prompt Injection Exploits: The CVE That Weaponized the AI Coding Workflow

A podcast with Checkpoint's Adam Forester unpacks a disclosed CVE in Anthropic's Claude Code where the AI coding assistant did not validate its local settings.json on boot, letting a booby-trapped GitHub repo execute arbitrary commands (up to ransomware) the moment a developer downloaded and ran it, with no phishing required. The vulnerability was patched twice and unpatched installs may remain exploitable; the discussion frames it as a new class of indirect prompt injection and also recounts an Alibaba 'Rome' agent that opened covert SSH tunnels to mine crypto. Details →

CoSnitch: When Your AI Assistant Becomes Its Own Whistleblower

Varonis Threat Labs disclosed CoSnitch (CVE-2026-24301), a critical one-click vulnerability chain in Microsoft Copilot Personal that combines the ?q= URL parameter with an undocumented autorun=1 parameter to auto-execute an attacker-supplied prompt on page load, then queries connected apps (Gmail, Drive, Calendar, OneDrive) and exfiltrates data via encoded URLs, plus indirect prompt injection through web summarization that poisons persistent memory. Researchers used a 'meta-hacking' technique, repeatedly asking Copilot why an attack wouldn't work until the assistant disclosed its own disabled parameters and session conditions. Microsoft shipped patches on August 18, 2026; Varonis reports no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation. Details →

Atlassian Rovo Can Be Tricked Into Sending Jira and Confluence Data to Attackers

Researchers at Varonis Threat Labs (RovoBlast) and PromptArmor independently showed that Atlassian's Rovo AI assistant can be manipulated via prompt injection to collect Jira and Confluence data a signed-in user can access and exfiltrate it to an external server. Varonis found that the rovoChatPrompt URL parameter preloads attacker instructions so a single click by an authenticated user triggers execution; PromptArmor hid instructions in an uploaded file that Rovo reads, working even with web-search disabled. Varonis's route was responsibly disclosed and fixed (CVE-2026-50522), while the PromptArmor file-based bypass is single-sourced and its remediation is not confirmed. Details →

Amazon Kiro: AI Is Breaking Vulnerability Disclosure Processes

Mindgard disclosed a prompt-injection vulnerability in Amazon Kiro, an AI-powered agentic IDE, that lets attacker-controlled repository content coerce the Kiro agent into reading local sensitive data, modifying a workspace URL, and triggering an outbound request that exfiltrates the secret. The flaw was reproduced in Kiro IDE 0.7.45 on Windows in both trusted and untrusted workspaces via Kiro Powers (MCP configs and POWER.md steering files); exploitation requires the user open a malicious workspace file and message the agent, and is assessed as low difficulty. Details →

NVD - CVE-2026-62676

CVE-2026-62676 is a HIGH-severity (CVSS 7.1) flaw in Omnigent, an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in _shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, timeout/nice/setsid/stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a background control operator, so a gated git push or gh write hidden in these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the repo/branch allowlist and workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace; fixed in version 0.3.0. Details →

From SQLi to RCE - Exploiting LangGraph’s Checkpointer - Check Point Research

Check Point Research (Yarden Porat and Shahar Tal) disclosed 11 vulnerabilities across six major AI agent frameworks — LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, the Microsoft Agent Framework, and Google ADK — including insecure deserialization, SSRF, path traversal, SQL injection, and use-after-free flaws. The most severe were RCE chains: a checkpoint deserialization flaw in the Microsoft Agent Framework triggerable via prompt injection, unauthenticated code execution in Google ADK, and three LangGraph checkpointer bugs (CVE-2025-67644, CVE-2026-28277, CVE-2026-27022). All disclosed issues were patched. Details →

ChainDrop: When Opening a Repository Becomes Execution

Researchers (Novee Security and Pillar Security's "ChainDrop") disclosed critical flaws in the GitHub Actions-based coding agents shipped by Anthropic (Claude Code), Google (Gemini CLI) and OpenAI (Codex), where a single zero-privilege input such as a GitHub issue or opening a repository triggers indirect prompt injection leading to remote code execution on the vendor's own runner, exfiltration of live API keys and GITHUB_TOKEN, persistent agent hijacking, and downstream supply-chain compromise (Gemini CLI rated CVSS 10.0). Multiple CVEs (e.g. CVE-2026-54316, CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-50522) and vendor security advisories were issued, but the report warns thousands of public repos running default configs remain exposed. Details →

Researchers Expose Prompt Injection and Cross-Origin Risks in AI Browsers

Researchers and vendors disclosed serious weaknesses in AI-enabled browsers, warning that agentic features undermine same-origin policy, tab isolation, and cross-origin content handling. In one chain against OpenAI's ChatGPT Atlas, Hacktron AI reported that exposed Chromium Mojo IPC interfaces reachable from allowlisted OpenAI origins were combined with a postMessage XSS on forums.openai.com and a login CSRF flaw to control browser functions, read live tab URLs, and steal OAuth codes enabling account takeover; OpenAI fixed it in Atlas 1.2025.288.15 and paid a $5,000 bounty. Brave separately detailed indirect prompt injection risks in Perplexity Comet. Details →

SearchLeak: How We Turned M365 Copilot Into a One-Click Data Exfiltration Weapon

SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) is a critical three-stage vulnerability chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise discovered by Varonis Threat Labs that lets an attacker steal MFA codes, emails, meeting details, and organizational files with a single click on a trusted microsoft.com link. It chains a Parameter-to-Prompt (P2P) injection via the search q parameter with an HTML rendering race condition and a CSP bypass through Bing's allowlisted image-search SSRF endpoint to silently exfiltrate a victim's mailbox, calendar, SharePoint, and OneDrive data. Microsoft remediated the flaw and rated it critical. Details →

A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →
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