First reported · updated · 8 reports huggingface.co
Lead dispatch
First reported · updated · 2 reports island.io
AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale
The FakeGit campaign, detailed by Island security researcher Oleg Zaytsev, uses roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware, which establishes persistence and installs the StealC information stealer. Researchers coined the technique 'AgentBaiting,' where AI agents like Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious READMEs as legitimate documentation, and hand installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads and peaked in April 2026.supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-distribution · agent-baiting
mcp · ai-agents · llm · github
Severity
0.78
The wire · latest
First reported github.com
AI Agents Project Viewer Privilege Escalation via run_node_tool · Advisory · n8n-io/n8n
A GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9) for n8n discloses a privilege-escalation flaw in its AI Agents feature: a read-only Project Viewer could chat with an agent whose node tools were enabled and, via the run_node_tool authorized only by the agent:execute scope, execute arbitrary tool nodes using the project's credentials without authorization checks. Where command- or file-capable nodes (Execute Command, SSH) are enabled, this could extend to arbitrary command execution on the n8n host. The issue is fixed in n8n versions 2.29.8 and 2.30.1. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports manifold.security
Microsoft Azure DevOps MCP Flaw Lets Hidden PR Comments Hijack AI Review Agents
Manifold Security disclosed a confused-deputy vulnerability in Microsoft's official Azure DevOps MCP server where a pull request description tool returned PR text without the prompt-injection guardrail applied to other tools. An attacker can embed an invisible HTML comment in a PR description that renders as nothing in the web UI but is passed verbatim to a reviewer's AI coding agent, hijacking it to access projects the attacker cannot reach and exfiltrate what it finds. Microsoft addressed the issue in a subsequent release (v2.8.0). Details →First reported embracethered.com
AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
AWS Kiro, an agentic coding IDE, was vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via indirect prompt injection: hidden text on a web page (or a comment in a source file) processed by the agent could make Kiro use its no-approval fsWrite tool to rewrite ~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json (or allowlist all Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json), causing it to launch attacker-specified MCP servers/commands and achieve RCE on the developer's machine, bypassing the human 'allow' approval boundary. Discovered by Intezer with Kodem Security and independently by Embrace The Red (Johann Rehberger); AWS has patched the issue. Details →First reported pillar.security
The Week of Sandbox Escapes
Pillar Security researchers demonstrated seven sandbox-escape techniques against four AI coding agents — Cursor, OpenAI's Codex, Google's Gemini CLI and Antigravity — where a sandboxed agent writes workspace files that trusted tools running outside the sandbox (Python extensions, Git integrations, hook engines, Docker daemons) later execute. Prompt injection planted in a README, issue, dependency, or diff triggers local command execution on the developer's machine; one Cursor flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-48124 and fixed in version 3.0.0, with most issues patched and vendor-acknowledged. Details →First reported · updated · 5 reports wiz.io
GhostApproval: AI Coding Assistant Trust Boundary Flaw
Wiz researchers disclosed GhostApproval (CVE-2026-12958 and related), a symlink-following vulnerability pattern (CWE-61 plus CWE-451 UI misrepresentation) affecting six top AI coding assistants: Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf. A malicious repository disguises a symlink as an innocuous config file so that when the agent 'sets up the workspace' it writes an attacker SSH key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys — sometimes before any confirmation dialog — while the human-in-the-loop approval prompt conceals the true target, enabling remote code execution. AWS, Cursor, and Google fixed the issue; two vendors went silent and one called it outside its threat model. Details →First reported strobes.co
CVE-2026-23744 - CVE Details, Severity, and Analysis | Strobes VI
CVE-2026-23744 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) remote code execution vulnerability in MCPJam Inspector versions 1.4.2 and earlier, a local-first development platform for MCP servers. Because the tool binds to 0.0.0.0 and its /api/mcp/connect endpoint extracts command and args without security checks, an attacker can send a crafted, unauthenticated HTTP request to trigger arbitrary command execution with no user interaction; public PoCs and vendor patches are available. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports theregister.com
Red teamers turned Claude Desktop into a double agent to do their evil bidding
Oasis Security disclosed "PromptFiction," a vulnerability in Anthropic's Claude Desktop where a single click on a trusted-looking claude:// URL silently submitted attacker-controlled prompts to the assistant with no user confirmation. Chained with the earlier "Claudy Day" trio of flaws, it could enable silent exfiltration of prior conversations and — when Anthropic's official Filesystem MCP server is installed — file read/write, persistence, and remote code execution. Anthropic has fixed the flaw. Details →First reported embracethered.com
From Indirect Prompt Injection to DNS Exfiltration in macOS Terminal
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) demonstrates a proof-of-concept where an indirect prompt injection hidden in a spreadsheet cell hijacks an LLM-integrated CLI tool to emit ANSI escape codes, which the macOS Terminal app interprets to issue DNS requests that exfiltrate data from other rows. Building on prior Terminal DiLLMa research and David Leadbeater's original finding, the post reports that Apple has fixed the macOS Terminal behavior enabling the DNS-based exfiltration. Details →First reported bugcrowd.com
One-Click Data Exfiltration via rovoChatPrompt URL Parameter (Confluence / Rovo) - CrowdStream
A disclosed and now-patched vulnerability in Atlassian Rovo, the default AI assistant across Confluence and other Atlassian products, allowed the `rovoChatPrompt` URL parameter to preload an arbitrary prompt into a victim's Rovo chat. When an authenticated user clicked a crafted link, Rovo executed the embedded prompt as a genuine query, using indirect task-framed language ('help me identify this image') to bypass guardrails and exfiltrate Confluence pages, secrets, and connected-app data (Jira, SharePoint, Outlook) to an attacker host via an image-fetch URL. Atlassian remediated the issue server-side and the reporter validated the fix. Details →First reported · updated · 3 reports catonetworks.com
DuneSlide: Two Critical RCE vulnerabilities
Cato AI Labs disclosed two critical vulnerabilities in Cursor IDE, dubbed DuneSlide (CVE-2026-50548 and CVE-2026-50549, both CVSS 9.8), that allow zero-click prompt injection to escape the editor's command sandbox and achieve remote code execution. CVE-2026-50548 abuses the run_terminal_cmd tool's working_directory parameter to add attacker-chosen folders to the allowed-write list, letting an attacker overwrite the cursorsandbox binary or shell startup files and turn sandboxed commands into full system compromise. Cursor patched both in version 3.0, released April 2; earlier 2.x builds remain exposed. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports cereblab.com
Grok Build Uploads Entire Git Repositories to xAI Storage, Not Just Files It Reads
AI safety researcher Cereblab found that xAI's Grok Build CLI uploaded users' entire Git repositories — including files it was explicitly told not to open and secrets deleted from Git history — as Git bundles to a Google Cloud Storage bucket, even on an idle 'reply OK' prompt. The behavior was reproduced across multiple codebases and captured on the wire via mitmproxy; xAI later disabled it server-side with a disable_codebase_upload flag and Musk promised deletion of uploaded data. Details →First reported arxiv.org
A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →First reported tabstack.ai
Hardening AI Web Agents: How We're Securing Tabstack Against Indirect Prompt Injection | Tabstack Blog
Tabstack (Mozilla) disclosed an indirect prompt injection vulnerability in its /v1/automate web-agent endpoint, found by Brave researchers, where hidden white-on-white instructions on a target page caused the autonomous agent to exfiltrate the user's conversation history to an external form. The flaw has been patched with a structural 'action firewall' that classifies form interactions via DOM metadata and provenance rather than trying to detect malicious text. Details →First reported microsoft.com
AutoJack: How a single page can RCE the host running your AI agent | Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft researchers disclosed AutoJack, an exploit chain in AutoGen Studio where untrusted web content rendered by a browsing agent can reach a local MCP WebSocket and spawn arbitrary processes on the host, crossing the localhost trust boundary to achieve RCE. The issue was reported to MSRC and hardened upstream in commit b047730; the vulnerable MCP WebSocket surface was never shipped in a PyPI release. Details →How the wire is made
Poll & cluster
Internet is crawled for AI security news and near-duplicate coverage is embedded and grouped into durable items.
Curate
AI Agent filters for agentic-AI relevance, classifies and tags each item, scores severity for threats, and writes the summary.
Every item here is one machine-curated intelligence object, not a headline.
Read the wire for free. There is a small charge to ask the index questions.
The wire, open
The complete curated feed, no key required.
- GET /feed.xml — RSS 2.0, every item
- GET /api/items — read-only
The vector desk
Query the index by meaning, not just keyword.
- GET /api/items?tags=&minSeverity=&itemType=
- GET /api/search?q= — keyword
- GET /api/semantic?q= — vector