First reported embracethered.com
Lead dispatch
First reported island.io
AgentBaiting: How Fake AI Skills Deliver Malware at Scale
Island security researchers uncovered the FakeGit campaign, which used roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories—over 800 posing as AI Skills or MCP servers—to deliver SmartLoader malware that installs the StealC information stealer. The campaign introduces a technique called AgentBaiting, in which AI agents such as Claude Code, Gemini, and ChatGPT autonomously discover the attacker repositories, treat the malicious README as legitimate documentation, and pass installation instructions to users; the operation recorded over 14 million downloads.supply-chain · tool-abuse · malware-delivery · agentbaiting
mcp · ai-agents · ai-skills · llm · copilot
Severity
0.75
The wire · latest
First reported pillar.security
The Week of Sandbox Escapes
Pillar Security researchers demonstrated seven sandbox-escape techniques against four AI coding agents — Cursor, OpenAI's Codex, Google's Gemini CLI and Antigravity — where a sandboxed agent writes workspace files that trusted tools running outside the sandbox (Python extensions, Git integrations, hook engines, Docker daemons) later execute. Prompt injection planted in a README, issue, dependency, or diff triggers local command execution on the developer's machine; one Cursor flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-48124 and fixed in version 3.0.0, with most issues patched and vendor-acknowledged. Details →First reported · updated · 5 reports wiz.io
GhostApproval: AI Coding Assistant Trust Boundary Flaw
Wiz researchers disclosed GhostApproval (CVE-2026-12958 and related), a symlink-following vulnerability pattern (CWE-61 plus CWE-451 UI misrepresentation) affecting six top AI coding assistants: Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf. A malicious repository disguises a symlink as an innocuous config file so that when the agent 'sets up the workspace' it writes an attacker SSH key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys — sometimes before any confirmation dialog — while the human-in-the-loop approval prompt conceals the true target, enabling remote code execution. AWS, Cursor, and Google fixed the issue; two vendors went silent and one called it outside its threat model. Details →First reported embracethered.com
From Indirect Prompt Injection to DNS Exfiltration in macOS Terminal
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) demonstrates a proof-of-concept where an indirect prompt injection hidden in a spreadsheet cell hijacks an LLM-integrated CLI tool to emit ANSI escape codes, which the macOS Terminal app interprets to issue DNS requests that exfiltrate data from other rows. Building on prior Terminal DiLLMa research and David Leadbeater's original finding, the post reports that Apple has fixed the macOS Terminal behavior enabling the DNS-based exfiltration. Details →First reported · updated · 2 reports paloaltonetworks.com
Pickle in the Middle – Hijacking Vertex AI Model Uploads for Cross-Tenant RCE
Palo Alto Unit 42 (Ori Hadad) disclosed CVE-2026-0257, a flaw in Google's Vertex AI Python SDK (python-aiplatform) where model uploads relied on an attacker-predictable Google Cloud Storage bucket, enabling 'bucket squatting.' An attacker could pre-register the expected bucket and substitute a malicious pickle/joblib model artifact, achieving cross-tenant remote code execution when the poisoned model was deserialized. Google fixed the issue in SDK releases v1.148.0/v1.148.1. Details →First reported arxiv.org
A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
Researchers detailed three now-patched high-severity flaws (GHSA-hjr6-g723-hmfm, GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm, GHSA-575v-8hfq-m3mc; CVE-2026-46817, CVE-2026-55200) in the OpenClaw personal AI assistant framework that compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution path — from an LLM tool call triggered via a WhatsApp message to command execution on the host. The chain abuses OS command injection and an incomplete disallowed-input filter in the exec allowlist, whose closed-world lexical parsing is defeated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation; a companion arXiv analysis taxonomizes 470 advisories and shows a malicious plugin skill bypassing the exec pipeline entirely. Details →First reported microsoft.com
AutoJack: How a single page can RCE the host running your AI agent | Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft researchers disclosed AutoJack, an exploit chain in AutoGen Studio where untrusted web content rendered by a browsing agent can reach a local MCP WebSocket and spawn arbitrary processes on the host, crossing the localhost trust boundary to achieve RCE. The issue was reported to MSRC and hardened upstream in commit b047730; the vulnerable MCP WebSocket surface was never shipped in a PyPI release. Details →How the wire is made
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