First reported itmeetsot.eu
Research · latest
First reported veganmosfet.codeberg.page
From /init to Code Execution with Opus-5 in Claude Code - An Indirect Prompt Injection Story - IT meets OT
A security researcher demonstrates an indirect prompt injection against Claude Code running Opus-5 in YOLO mode (--dangerously-skip-permissions), where a single /init on a repo containing only a steganography-laden README.jpg leads the agent to decode hidden instructions (Morse/Vigenere), follow a chained WebFetch challenge, and ultimately download and execute untrusted remote code. Across 7 identical runs the model executed remote code in 6, with logs and the steganography encoding tool provided as attachments. Details →How the wire is made
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