First reported medium.com
Analysis · latest
First reported · updated · 2 reports nhimg.org
Who is accountable when an AI agent triggers code execution through a trusted tool?
An NHIMG editorial FAQ argues that accountability for an AI agent triggering code execution through a trusted tool sits with the teams that defined the tool's trust boundary, approval model, and runtime policy, not just whoever deployed it. It frames agentic risk as a governance and identity problem, offering a checklist for evaluating execution paths (identity presented, static vs context-aware access, credential lifetime, file/process write capability, and approval scope) and references OWASP Agentic Top 10, NIST AI RMF, and the CSA MAESTRO framework. Details →How the wire is made
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