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AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection

Researchers found a vulnerability (CVE-2026-10591) in AWS Kiro, an agentic IDE, where hidden instructions planted in a web page or source file that Kiro processes can trigger indirect prompt injection to rewrite Kiro's own MCP server configuration (~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json) or allowlist arbitrary Bash commands in .vscode/settings.json, achieving arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine with no approval prompt. The human-in-the-loop approval boundary is bypassed because Kiro can write to these config files without user consent, and AWS has issued a fix and CVE.

indirect-prompt-injection · prompt-injection · remote-code-execution · tool-abuse · config-poisoning
ai-agents · mcp · llm · agentic-ide

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JADEPUFFER: Agentic ransomware for automated database extortion

Sysdig's Threat Research Team documented JADEPUFFER, assessed as the first end-to-end agentic ransomware operation, in which an autonomous LLM-based agent executed a full intrusion lifecycle—initial access via a compromised Langflow instance (CVE-2025-3248), credential and S3 enumeration, Nacos configuration-server takeover (CVE-2021-29441, default JWT key forgery), persistence, and database extortion—without documented human decisions. Captured payloads show plan-act-observe-adjust behavior, including self-correction 31 seconds after a failed admin-backdoor insertion, across 600+ purposeful payloads in one compressed operation. Details →

An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation

Unit 42 documents an investigation into an AI-assisted cyber attack in which an agentic AI system drove attack steps end-to-end, compressing a multi-week intrusion into hours. Related Sysdig research on the actor tracked as JadePuffer describes the first documented agentic ransomware operation, where an AI agent handled reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, persistence, encryption and the ransom note after gaining access via the Langflow vulnerability CVE-2025-3248, running over 600 payloads and fixing a failed backdoor in 31 seconds. Details →

Autonomous AI Intrusions Are Here: Lessons from the Hugging Face Compromise

An embracethered.com analysis examines two reported autonomous-AI intrusions: a Hugging Face compromise that Hugging Face says was driven end-to-end by an autonomous AI agent (entering via a malicious dataset and code-execution paths in its processing pipeline, then harvesting cloud/cluster credentials and moving laterally across 17,000+ recorded actions), and Sysdig's JADEPUFFER agent-driven ransomware that autonomously enumerated services, exploited Nacos auth bypass (CVE-2021-29441), forged JWTs, and self-corrected failed payloads to insert a backdoor admin. The write-up highlights a defensive asymmetry in which commercial-model safety guardrails blocked Hugging Face's own forensic analysis, forcing a pivot to a locally hosted open-weight model, and criticizes the lack of shared IOCs. Details →
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